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The paper examines severance pay programs around the world by providing the first ever 
overview of existing programs, examining their historic development, assessing their 
economic rationale and describing current reform attempts. While a significant part of the 
paper is devoted to a comprehensive 183 cross country review of existing severance 
arrangements and their characteristics, the paper goes beyond a mere description. It 
develops and empirically tests three hypotheses about the economic rationale of the 
program, namely severance pay being: (i) a primitive income protection program, (ii) an 
efficiency enhancing human resource instrument, and (iii) a job protection instrument. The 
paper also reviews the recent reforms of Austria, Chile, Italy and Korea. 
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31.  Introduction: Objectives, Methods, and Structure 
Severance pay programs exist in most countries around the world. They typically provide lump 
sum cash payments to workers who involuntarily or voluntarily separate from their employers.   
The size of the payment is usually related to the number of years worked with the last employer, 
and it is linked to the last salary in the job. Such payments were provided in many countries by 
employers before they were required by law.  Firm-based severance pay schemes often also exist 
in parallel to legislated provisions.  Moreover, firms may use voluntary severance pay programs 
as an important management tool for retaining skilled workers.  In most cases, precedent for 
these programs existed before the introduction of formal social insurance schemes across the 
world, so severance payment systems may be considered a primitive form of unemployment 
compensation or pension allowance.  Despite their widespread use, many aspects of severance 
pay programs including their origin, coverage, and interaction with other income support 
programs have not been well researched, particularly for developing countries. To the best of our 
knowledge, even the most basic descriptive information about severance payment schemes 
around the world has not been previously compiled.  
One of the difficulties of examining the topic of severance pay is that different types of cash 
payments can be considered as forms of severance payments and many terms exist in English 
and other languages.  Such terms include dismissal compensation, redundancy compensation, 
termination benefits, seniority pay, indemnities, and leaving allowances. While one can, in 
principle, assign special objectives to each benefit type (for example, dismissal compensation to 
involuntary job separation, and termination benefits to any kind of separation, including 
retirement), reality proves more complex as severance payments seem to serve multiple 
concurrent functions. 
The objective of this paper is to review severance pay programs around the world by providing 
an overview of existing programs, examining their historic development, assessing their 
economic rationale, and describing current reform attempts. While the thrust of the paper is 
devoted to a comprehensive cross country presentation of existing severance arrangements and 
their characteristics, the paper goes beyond a mere description and develops and empirically tests 
three hypotheses about the economic rationale of the program, namely severance pay being: (i) a 
primitive income protection instrument, (ii) an efficiency enhancing human resource instrument, 
and (iii) a job protection instrument. The paper also reviews the recent reforms of Austria, Chile, 
Italy and Korea. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows:  Section 2 examines the historic origins of 
severance pay and identifies competing economic justifications for its existence (details for more 
historically inclined reader are offered in Annex 1).  Section 3 explains how the severance pay 
programs work by summarizing their stylized features, and then describes the complied 
inventory of existing severance pay programs around the world, explaining key features of 
severance pay programs, their broad characteristics as well as commonalities and differences 
between countries and regions. Details of programs in individual countries are presented in a 
comprehensive matrix in Annex 2.  Section 4 discusses the economic rationale of severance pay, 
develops three hypotheses (that severance pay is a primitive income protection program, an 
efficiency enhancing human resource instrument, or a job protection instrument), and tests them 
with simple but robust econometric specifications.  The concluding Section 5 offers a brief 
summary, policy implications, and suggestions for future research.   
42.  The Origins of Severance Pay 
While mandated pension, health and unemployment benefits and their historical origins are well 
known and documented, the same cannot be said for severance benefits.
1 This Section aims to 
achieve a better understanding of severance pay by examining why these programs have been 
created in the first place.  The section focuses on three key events that influenced the 
introduction of severance pay programs across the world – the introduction of national labor 
codes, early industrial restructuring, and the expansion of the welfare state after WWII – and 
alludes to key hypotheses proposed to explain the economic rationale of severance pay. The 
section ends with a summary of the historic lessons (further historical details can be found in 
Annex 1).  
2.1  Severance Mandates: Three Explanations  
The available literature on this topic
2 suggests three main historical determinants of severance 
mandates across the world:  (i) the creation of broader labor codes, (ii) early industrial 
restructuring and spells of high-level unemployment in the interwar period, and (iii) the 
expansion of the welfare state after WW II.  These determinants are at times intermingled with 
two main reasons why firms choose to voluntarily provide severances pay: one-off payments 
during industrial restructuring to allow for quick action and to avoid political fall-out, and 
seniority-related payments – corporate pensions and severance – that balance the interest of firms 
and workers in knowledge intensive firms.  
For developing countries, these historic events may not have had the same significance.   
Legislation in these countries seems to have arisen by copying of the colonial powers’ labor 
codes and social security systems. Despite these common origins, actual system designs in 
developing countries are quite diverse and will be the focus of Section 3.  
Labor Code  
The first and main origin of severance payments is the creation of, and the link to, the labor code 
in the industrializing countries of the North in the 19th century. The birth of modern labor 
standards is traced back to 1802 when Sir Robert Peel introduced the English Factory Act. It was 
a symbolic act that placed restrictions on maximum working hours of apprentices. By 1875, both 
Britain and U.S. achieved complete legal equivalence in the relationship between employer and 
worker. The same is true for countries of Continental Europe around the same period. Each party 
was free to accept or reject offers, terminate contracts, and expect to pay damages if the 
termination amounted to breach of contract.  
                                                 
1 Requests for information addressed to the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the International Social 
Security Organization (ISSA) produced some but limited information, as did selective requests with individual 
researchers. Special thanks go to Roddy Mckinnon from ISSA who helped dig-up some of the historical material. 
2 We came across the following literature dealing with severance-type payments in a historic perspective.  For the 
US, UK, Japanese and some European origins and experience with severance or dismissal payments till the early 
1940s, see Hawkins (1940, 1942).  Historic hints and information after WW II are contained in two articles in the 
International Labor Review, with papers by Herz (1954) and Visisombat (1968).  This second paper has information 
about the experience in French-speaking Africa.  A book from this period (Meyers, 1964) provides information 
about the US. Recent writings on severance payments with historic references include Miron and Weil (1997), Basu 
et al. (2003), and Parsons (2005a,b). 
What we did not come across and what may be an interesting and open research field concerns the role of social 
partners (trade unions and employers’ organization) in the historic evolution of severance pay, and currently their 
role in the reform of severance pay, or the lack of it. 
5Building on the limited nineteenth century civil codes, twentieth century legislatures took up the 
question of the regulation of employment contracts and intervened to secure protection for 
workers in case of dismissal. This was done by means of amendments to the civil, commercial or 
industrial codes, legislation on contracts of employment, and the promulgation of labor codes or 
even by special legislation with the sole object in view (Herz, 1954: 299-230).   
It appears that severance payment at this time was granted if the notice period for dismissal was 
not respected by the employer. That is, dismissal payment was a compensation for breach of 
labor contract by the employer.  As the notice period at this time was short, the non-codified 
severance payments can be expected to have been small. 
Early Industrial Restructuring 
The second main element for the emergence and persistence of severance payments were the 
technological changes of the late 1800s and the large-scale unemployment of the depression in 
the 1930s. Although fully developed dismissal compensation is almost entirely a post-WWI 
development, laws providing short periods of dismissal notice date back to the nineteenth 
century in several European countries. 
It appears that issues of job security first emerged in the railroad industry. For example, in the 
1870s and 1880s in France, a great number of railroad dismissal cases came to court and led to 
judgments that can be seen as important starting points for the establishment of severance pay. 
(See Box 2.1). 
 
Following the end of WWI and the creation of the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 
1919, legislation recognizing labor rights, and the establishment of various types of workers 
councils sprang up in Europe which protected workers in time of dismissal. In South and Central 
Box 2.1 Railroad Workers and Severance Pay 
The case of railroad workers demanded particular attention because they worked in a new industry. 
Established industries had specific dismissal procedures, which were often tied to localities. Such 
norms were absent in the railroad industry. Moreover, railroad workers had highly specialized skills 
that tied them to working in railroads, and thus had weaker bargaining power vis-à-vis their 
employers. By training to work in the rail road industry, they limited their future to working in this 
specific area. 
Cases of railroad workers also came to court because of pension problems, as workers could lose 
their pensions upon being fired. Severance pay may have served as an instrument to compensate for 
these losses. By 1890, laws had evolved to confirm the previous court rulings controlling for abuses of 
pension funds. Subsequently, legislation began to favor the granting of special job protection to 
railroad workers. 
Throughout France, the practice of severance pay evolved through the lower courts, which recognized 
increasingly longer notice periods and greater indemnities for dismissed workers. Severance pay also 
covered a growing number of sectors. By the 1950s severance pay allowances already figured into 
white collar and supervisory employment.  It also expanded to manual workers, as evidenced in 
national and regional plant agreements.  
Source: Herz, 1954. 
6America definite provisions for dismissal compensation were introduced. In 1936, Japan adopted 
a contributory funded system for dismissal payments. 
Greece established special regulations for workers displaced by cigarette machinery and for 
those dismissed because of new methods in handling cargoes in boats. In Germany, and before 
the Nazi regime, collective agreements had been widely adopted. In 1927, over 12 million people 
were covered by such agreements. Some employers adopted particularly innovative approaches 
to severance pay (see Box 2.2). At that time, also the French system focused on voluntary 
provisions secured through collective bargaining. 
 
Box 2.2 Severance pay as Commitment Technology? An early example of the human resource 
management of severance pay 
While there is little economic history evidence about how and why severance pay evolved, the case of 
the Carl Zeiss foundation in Germany stands out for its unique approach and enduring implications. It 
also provides one of the first documented cases of the use of severance pay (1889). Its social welfare 
approach responded to particular competitive circumstances, and exemplifies how severance pay 
might serve as a human resource management and efficiency enhancing instrument. 
The Carl Zeiss foundation, the owner of the later world renowned producer of specialized glasses,  
offered paid vacation, sickness benefits, a nine hour working day, pension fund, and compensation in 
cases of dismissal. These seemingly overgenerous provisions actually held strategic value for both the 
firm and workers. The firm and worker both faced a challenge of establishing the trust required for a 
long term employment relationship. The employer was required to invest heavily in workers’ training, 
which also made them more attractive to be poached by other employers who might offer higher 
wages. Employers would also suffer productivity losses and incur additional costs for recruiting and 
hiring new workers. To keep employees, the firm was required to pay a high wage premium, the pay 
exceeding the worker’s actual productivity would render this approach unsustainable. Employers 
could also benefit from flexibility in dismissals given uncertain market conditions.  
The actual experience of the Carl Zeiss foundation closely reflects these conditions. The firm’s success 
depended on the implementation of highly technical and continuous training, which in turn required a 
long term relationship with employees. As Zeiss workers were sought after by competitor firms and 
labor was becoming more mobile, the stability of a long term employment relationship was threatened 
indeed. But uncertainties in this new market also implied that Zeiss workers faced the possibility of 
layoffs. In response the articles of agreement of the foundation (as the sole owner of the firm) 
guaranteed social obligations such as severance pay and pensions. The pension fund helped commit 
Zeiss workers to the long term employment relationship, especially as their pensions grew the longer 
they remained employed with the firm (the Zeiss pension fund grew almost tenfold between 1895 and 
1905). With severance pay equal to a half year’s salary, it also served as a significant deterrent to 
firing workers, since the costs incurred would be especially high for skilled workers (with more 
experience). Evidence suggests that both mechanisms helped produced, stable and long term 
employment relationships. A telling sign is also that during Germany’s economic downturns of the 
1930s an unusually low proportion of workers depended on social welfare in Jena, home of Carl 
Zeiss. 
Based on Abraham, M. and B. Prosch (2000). 
 
7In April 1932, the governing body of the ILO approved a report of the unemployment committee 
favoring dismissal compensation for salaried employees. The Advisory Committee on Salaried 
Employees stated in 1936, “in countries where formal rules are not in existence they should be 
introduced by legislation or collective agreements.” By 1940, around forty countries had passed 
laws providing notice or compensation for dismissed industrial workers or salaried employees. 
Until 1940, severance payments were generally only for salaried employees but in countries with 
no unemployment insurance programs the trend was to include all workers. Many companies’ 
plans initially were adopted to meet particular situations such as technological displacement. 
Legislation later became broader in its coverage. 
Introduction and Expansion of the Welfare State 
The economic, social and political events of the interwar period and World War II were the third 
critical component to the introduction and expansion of the welfare state.  It led to the legislation 
of key social security programs in order to address key contingencies in the post-war period of 
formal sector workers. These benefits in cash or kind to the benefit of employees were now 
typically legislated outside the labor code or similar legislation.  Coverage expanded to a greater 
share of the labor force with improved eligibility conditions and increased generosity. 
This expansion affected formal sector workers across the world and had also a bearing on 
severance pay in coverage and generosity. The scope of coverage of severance pay was often 
increased in parallel to the expansion of social security benefits.  Social insurance coverage 
expansion proved difficult and unemployment insurance not advisable in low and middle income 
countries with a large informal economy. This gave rise to expansion of severance pay programs 
to larger group of workers or improved generosity, or provisions that have main similarities with 
severance pay, but are typically legislated outside the labor code. Unemployment insurance 
savings accounts introduced in Latin America belong to them (see Ferrer and Riddell, 2011). 
Developing countries of the decolonizing South often inherited or copied the laws and 
regulations from the former colonial powers. For a number of other instances it has been 
suggested that the provision of severance pay in a number of developing countries was deemed a 
transient legislative measure, the need for which would decline with the development of fuller 
employment policy and an extensive social security system emulating the development in the 
North.  For example, the provision of severance pay was “subject to this obligation coming to an 
end on the promulgation of legislation concerning social insurance (Costa Rica) or to the 
replacement of compensation by benefits from a welfare fund (Dominican Republic, Egypt, 
Lebanon, Syria); see Herz (1954: 319).  
Among what were to become (former) Soviet countries, only for Estonia did we uncover 
evidence of early severance pay legislation (1934 and 1936). Severance pay or dismissals for that 
matter were essentially meaningless during the Soviet times and unemployment insurance did 
not exist. Employees could only be dismissed for extremely limited reasons, each of which 
required different, complex dismissal procedures. With the transition to the market, all countries 
adopted new severance pay legislations and unemployment benefit.   
2.2 Historic Lessons – a summary 
A number of features emerge from the historic accounts that are useful to understand the reason 
for the complexity of severance pay arrangements. These features also shed light on the 
8development of these arrangements over time in and across countries and eventually helped to 
guide the development of the cross-country inventory but also inspired the analysis.   
The historic overview of the prior Section and Annex 1 suggests the following features: 
  Many severance pay disbursements occurred during large-scale industrial restructuring, with 
provisions directly negotiated between firm and workers (trade unions) in an ad-hoc manner 
and adjusted to the specific restructuring process.  They often happened outside legislated 
rules or collective agreements. 
  There are various firm-based indications of how severance pay provisions together with 
occupational pensions have been used early on in knowledge-intensive sectors to establish a 
commitment technology both for employer and employee.  The loss of an occupation 
(defined benefit) pension for early leavers was balanced with severance pay commitments 
and hence firing costs for the employer.    
  Firm or industry-specific agreements still play a role in most countries above and beyond 
legislated rules or collective agreements with little information about the terms of references.  
In some countries, most prominently Germany, Japan and the US, they are the basis of 
severance pay as a mandated scheme does not exist.  
  Mandated severance pay provisions are a primitive form of social protection.  They were 
introduced in most but not all countries prior to other social protection mechanism, in 
particular unemployment and retirement benefits. 
  In developed economies severance pay was not abolished once related social security 
benefits had been established.  In most developing countries severance pay is still the key 
provision for the formal labor force as access and eligibility to unemployment and retirement 
benefits remain limited. 
  In countries with limited formal sector employment, severance pay is often seen as a key 
instrument for job protection.  Severance pay together with long notice periods and firing 
restrictions serve to protect workers in formal jobs from the main income loss in case of a 
dismissal. 
  The difference in coverage for unemployment and pension benefits between developed and 
developing economies suggests that the rationale for severance pay, its design features, and 
its interactions with related social benefits are different.  This suggests a need to differentiate 
conceptual frameworks between high and low income countries.  Middle income countries 
have characteristics for some group of workers closer to the first, for others closer to the low 
income group. 
93.  Mandated Severance Pay Programs: Modalities, Overview, Reforms 
Building upon the historical background of the prior Section, a cross country inventory of 
mandated severance pay and related variables has been established (Annex 2).  It attempts to 
present comparable information on the highly complex severance pay provisions that address key 
features for analysis and policy reform.  The annex contains more detailed information from 
2010 or latest information about mandated severance pay itself and about a variety of other 
country characteristics, including related social benefits, labor regulation, and the economic 
environment.  This Section starts with a review of key features of the severance pay system, and 
then continues with review of existing severance pay programs throughout the world. 
3.1   How does mandated severance pay work?  
Severance pay mandates require that firms make payments to workers upon separation from the 
firm. As with other cash benefit programs, many issues arise in the design of severance pay. 
Most fundamentally, under what conditions should the government preempt voluntary and 
collectively bargained severance plans, and mandate its own? Which workers should be eligible 
for the benefit, under what contingencies, and with what level of benefits? How are the benefits 
to be paid? Moreover, under the compulsory systems, which types of firms are obliged to pay for 
it? What happens if the firm is unable to make such payments due to insolvency? Are there any 
financing arrangements which facilitate such payments? Below we discuss the main modalities 
found in mandated severance pay plans when dealing with the above issues. 
Legal Source and Coverage:  Severance pay can be mandatory, i.e. required by law, usually 
established by the labor code; based on collective agreements established at industry or national 
level; and voluntary – if firms themselves decide whether to make such payments or not. One 
can obtain a rather good information about mandated schemes, very incomplete information 
about collective agreements, and none about voluntary schemes.  As a result, the presented 
benefit features apply to mandated schemes only. Mandatory programs may apply to all 
employees, to the private sector only, or to specific industrial sectors or occupations. Moreover, 
some countries limit mandatory programs only to firms above a certain size threshold, as larger 
firms are deemed better able to incur such expenses.  The information in the inventory highlights 
sectors (all or private only), and the excluded categories, if the information is available. 
Eligible Contingencies: In some countries, mandatory severance pay is required for all types of 
separations, but in other countries some types of separation may disqualify workers.  For 
example, workers dismissed due to misconduct (who separate by their own fault), and those who 
(voluntarily) quit, typically do not qualify for the entitlement. Again other countries provide 
mandatory severance pay only to workers who are discharged due to redundancy (economic) 
reasons but not for other valid reasons (dismissal), and yet others mandate severance pay only for 
cases of collective dismissals, or for certain groups of workers (such as white-collar workers).  In 
the inventory we differentiate between six main contingencies giving rise to eligibility:   
dismissal, redundancy, bankruptcy, disability, retirement, and end-of service.  The first four are 
involuntary separations, the last two voluntary.  In case of severance saving provisions based on 
individual accounts, typically all separating workers can – regardless of the reason for separation 
– make some withdrawals from their individual accounts. 
Parsons (2011b) makes the important distinction between severance insurance pay and severance 
insurance savings, arguing that these are polar cases of a continuum, with actual provisions 
10spread across the spectrum.  On the one side is the indemnity for dismissal, i.e. a compensation 
for losing the job by employer decision to severe the contract.  On the other side is a payment 
that is due whenever the individual leaves the firm (end-of-service pay).  The more contingencies 
give rise to eligibility, the more the severance pay moves from an indemnity insurance to a 
savings provision, with implications for hiring and firing costs for the employer (Parsons 2011a). 
Benefit Type and Benefit Level:  Severance pay has traditionally been of the defined benefit 
type and most designs remain of this form.  Increasingly, however, defined contribution benefits 
are being introduced. Under defined benefit plans, severance pay depends usually on the years of 
service and last wage, and has in most cases a vesting period, i.e. requiring a minimum number 
of months of employment for eligibility. Typically, each year of service is rewarded in 
proportion to the individual’s wage, for example, by half of the individual’s monthly wage per 
each year of service. More complex formulae exist wherein compensation is adjusted according 
to years of service and/or age tiers.   Under such structures, individuals with long records of 
service and/or older age are usually entitled to more generous severance pay. In some countries, 
the generosity of severance benefits may differ by the type of separation (e.g. dismissal, 
redundancy, collective redundancy, end-of service), between white- and blue-collar workers, 
permanent and fixed-term workers, and those covered by collective agreements and those not 
covered.  In some countries workers receive a seniority premium, depending on the reason for 
separation (usually in cases of non-fault dismissals). Some countries do not have explicit benefit 
formulas and leave determination of the severance pay, as well as the authorization to lay off 
workers, to special government bodies or court decisions.  
For defined contribution arrangements the benefit level depends on the contribution rate, the 
contribution base (wage) and the interest rate earned. Eligibility typically does not depend on 
cause of separation albeit the immediate access and size of the available resources may. 
As a rule, severance pay is paid in a lump-sum fashion (but it can also be paid in regular monthly 
payments – see the description of the new Austrian severance pay system below). In countries 
where employers contribute to individual unemployment accounts, payments could be deferred 
until retirement (and could conceivably be converted to annuities). 
Funding and Taxation. In general, severance pay is financed by employers. In countries with 
individual accounts, workers may also contribute. In some countries, the government provides 
financial assistance, particularly for large-scale restructuring operations which involve worker 
retrenchment in mass layoffs.  
The type of funding of severance pay has a bearing on incentives for employers and employees, 
including their trust in the arrangement.  There are four broad types of funding: 
  Internal and current funding of severance pay, i.e.  full payment out of current revenues at 
the time of separation, treating them as additional current wage expenditure; 
  Internal funding with book reserves within the firm, with the provisioning partially or 
fully tax exempt, where the latter at times made dependent on assets bought as collateral 
(say government bonds); 
  External provisioning via individual accounts held by financial market institutions 
(insurance company, commercial bank, or specialized institutions); 
  External provisioning through centralized and typically government institutions. 
Various considerations apply when deciding about which type of funding to use. Financing 
severance pay out of current cash flow creates a challenge for smaller employers even in good 
11times, and a non-payment threat for the worker in case of insolvency of firms of all size.  In 
countries with weak legal foundations the non-compliance by employers – even if solvent and 
liquid - is reportedly not an uncommon event that risks making any notionally generous benefits 
largely irrelevant.  In order to address the solvency and liquidity risks some countries have 
established special guarantee funds. Reserving internally may provide some limited protection 
but it may offer benefits for both firm and employee, in particular with underdeveloped financial 
markets.  Firms have additional self-financing and workers may profit from a higher rate of 
return (wage growth) than achieved on the financial market.  External provisioning with financial 
market institutions reduces the compliance, liquidity and solvency risks with the firm but 
exposes the worker to other risks, in particular the solvency risks and the financial market risks, 
including low rates of return.  External provisioning with centralized government institutions 
may better insure against liquidity and solvency risks but government funds, in general, have a 
bad track record on financial performance (Iglesias and Palacios, 2001). 
Severance benefits may be subject to different types of taxation and broadly three types can be 
differentiated: they may be tax exempt; partially taxed through tax allowances, ceilings or special 
rates; or fully taxed as normal wages or income.  Severance payments made by employers are 
typically but not always fully deductible as business expenditure (as wages are).  Any difference 
in tax treatment – full deductibility by the employer and non full taxation of severance pay by the 
employee compared to wages – invites tax arbitrage and collusion. 
Our inventory matrix of mandated severance pay programs around the world presents also 
several variables on country environment, as they may help explain both design features as well 
as the labor market effects of severance pay.  Many country features could be identified but the 
following are especially important: 
  The level of informality, which  is closely, but not fully linked with per-capita income; 
  The level of labor market regulation, in particular the dismissal process and the length of 
the dismissal notice; 
  The scope of coverage and  level of social benefits (or their absence), in particular for 
unemployment and old-age benefits;  
  The development of the financial market as enabling condition for some funding options; 
  The strength of trade unions across the country and in specific sectors. 
The level of formality has a bearing on both the coverage for retirement and related benefits as 
well as the type of unemployment benefits.  In an economy with high informality, a typical 
unemployment insurance scheme is unlikely to work as the status of the unemployed cannot be 
easily observed, would create major moral hazards, and as a consequence is rare.  This enhances 
the importance of severance unemployment income protection (together with tighter dismissal 
regulation as employment protection).  In case of no or limited access to retirement benefits, 
severance pay are may also be used as a retirement income mechanism, often with no limitations 
on the number of years that are used for its calculation.   
In the analysis of the effect of labor market programs on labor market outcome, the generosity of 
severance together with other social benefits (measure through the level of social payroll taxes) 
and advance notice and other components is often lumped together into an index to measure the 
strength of Employment Protection Legislation (see, e.g.  Heckmann and Pages, 2004; OECD, 
1999; Haltiwanger et al., 2008). To allow for testing of some hypotheses and to encourage 
12further analysis by the academic community on the scope and design of severance pay, the 
inventory includes data on some of these variables. 
3.2   Overview of mandated severance pay programs across the world 
Below we describe the salient features of the mandated severance pay programs around the 
world. To be as comprehensive as possible, we base our data base on the broadest collection of 
mandated severance pay schedules currently available (World Bank, Doing Business 2011), 
which covers 183 countries.  This offers almost complete coverage of countries and  allows us to 
assess regularities of severance pay in relation to broad country characteristics (such as GDP per 
capita) although some features are not well covered in a number of countries (e.g. on taxation of 
benefits or level of informality).  For these characteristics we have collected comprehensive and 
up-to-date information but at times had to make judgment calls between comprehensiveness and 
full comparability.  We will note these in the text and in the comments of Section in Annex 2. 
Scope of the coverage: Except in low-income, predominantly African and Pacific islands 
countries, most countries have either mandatory or quasi-mandatory severance pay systems. The 
information on the latter is incomplete:  We have information for countries with comprehensive 
collective agreements and for those with essential absence. Of the 183 countries in the inventory, 
152 have mandated schemes (82 percent), 18 have quasi-mandated schemes through 
comprehensive collective agreements, and only 13 (7 percent) have neither. At least 22 countries 
have both mandated severance pay and coverage under comprehensive collective agreements. 
For another 44 countries, available information suggests no or little coverage under such 
agreements. This leaves 98 countries for which we have no information on the scope of 
collective bargaining provision of severance benefits.      
The presence of mandatory severance pay systems varies broadly with the income level of the 
country (Figure 3.1, panel a).
3  The lowest share of mandated severance pay (70 percent) and the 
highest share of collective agreements when mandated provisions do not exist (almost 100 
percent) are found in high income countries.  In contrast, low income countries have the highest 
mandated share (almost 95%) and no known comprehensive collective agreements.  Upper 
middle income countries have high shares of mandated provisions. With respect to regions
4, 
severance pay is mandated in nearly all transition countries and about 90 percent of African, 
Middle East and Latin American countries.  Only 2/3 of OECD and Asian countries have them, 
with the absence of mandates concentrated in the Pacific Island countries (Figure 3.1, panel b).  
In contrast, quasi-mandatory systems are well-represented only in high-income/OECD countries 
(where about 40 percent of countries have them).  All OECD countries have either mandatory or 
quasi-mandatory system, although overall coverage may be low, as in the U.S. which has no 
mandatory severance and low collective bargaining density. 
 
                                                 
3 For the country’ income grouping and thresholds, see http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-
classifications/country-and-lending-groups. 
4 The country grouping is done by expected main similarities and deviates in some aspects from the World Bank 
institutional classification.  OECD covers old and new member countries (such as Mexico and Chile in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia from Europe and Central Asia - 
ECA); Transition covers countries both from other ECA and Asia (such as China and Vietnam); Asia covers both 
South and East Asia and the Pacific Islands; MENA the countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa; finally, 
Africa covers the countries south of the Sahara. 
13Figure 3.1a&b: Incidence of Mandated and Quasi-Mandated Severance Pay Programs - 
(a) by Country’ Income Levels  (b) by Regions 
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Source: Annex 2 
In most countries severance pay programs cover primarily the private sector and the share is 
particularly high among OECD countries where it reaches almost 80 percent (Figure 3.2, panel a 
and b). This may be explained by the special status enjoyed by public employees who have 
highly protected employment positions. In the transition economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe, however, 70 percent cover all employees.  In these countries a special employment 
position for civil servants did not exist during communist times and was not introduced with the 
move towards the market. In Africa and Asia, some 50 percent of countries mandate severance 
pay in all sectors. While in most countries firms of all sizes are covered, some countries limit 
coverage to firms with more than 5 workers (Colombia, South Korea until 2011), 10 (Germany, 
Morocco, Nepal, Slovenia, Venezuela), 15 (Australia, Italy, Kyrgyz Republic, Sri Lanka), 20 
(Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Pakistan, Poland, Switzerland), 30 (Turkey) and even 50 
(India) – see Annex 2. 
Figure 3.2a&b: Incidence of Mandated Severance Pay Programs in Sectors 
(a) by Country’ Income Levels  (b) by Regions 

























































all sectors  
Source: Annex 2 
Eligible Contingencies. The vast majority of countries with mandated schemes base benefit 
eligibility on the traditional contingencies – dismissal and redundancy.  They account for the 
majority of all countries, with only modest differences across income levels and regions.  If 
14presented by level of income, redundancy reasons are more prevalent than dismissal reasons; this 
is more blurred if presented by regions (Figure 3.3, panel a and b). For many of the 152 countries 
that mandate severance pay, redundancy and other eligibility conditions can be separated. For 46 
countries we know at least the redundancy criteria but not the others, hence they are put into an 
own category (“redundancy & unknown”). Explicit reference to bankruptcy and incapacity is 
made in some 10 percent of the countries only, in the transition economies in 20 percent.  Old 
age (retirement) as an explicit contingency exists in only few countries that are most clustered 
around the upper-middle income level and Latin America. The prevalence of end-of-service pay 
rises with the income level of countries from nil in low income to almost 30 percent in high 
income countries.  At the regional level, end-of-service pay is most prevalent in MNA countries 
where it reaches above 50 percent, followed by the OECD with some 30 percent. 
Figure 3.3a&b:  Eligibility Contingencies for Severance Pay (in percent) 
(a) by country’ income levels   (b) by regions 
Respective shares of types of termination payment
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Source: Annex 2 
A critical further eligibility condition for severance pay is the vesting period, i.e. the minimum 
number of months of employment required before the benefit formula becomes operative.  While 
these minimum service requirements (in months) differ little in  median values across income 
levels, means increase sharply with income level, from 10 months in low income to 33 months in 
high income countries (Figure 3.4, panel a and b). This is also reflected across regions, with 
OECD countries showing the highest mean level. What is striking in the regional comparison is 
the low median for Latin America (3 months) and the high value for the OECD countries 
Switzerland (240 months) and Denmark (144 months) which strongly influence the average for 
the OECD group. The high vesting periods suggest a different role of severance pay that may be 
15linked to the importance of corporate pensions in both countries. Without these two countries the 
average for OECD would actually be 17 months.
5 
 
Figure 3.4a&b:  Vesting Periods for Benefit Eligibility (in months) 
(a) by country’ income levels  (b) by regions 
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n =  9 n =  13 n =  14 n =  22
median =  12 median =  12 median =  12 median =  12
mean =  10.67 mean =  16.23 mean =  19.29 mean =  33.09






















































































n =  4 n =  18 n =  7 n =  5 n =  9 n =  15
median =  24 median =  12 median =  12 median =  3 median =  12 median =  12
mean =  24 mean =  36.44 mean =  18 mean =  9 mean =  16.44 mean =  15.6  
Source:  Annex 2 
 
Benefit level.  We focus in this section on (mandated) benefit levels for redundancy, i.e. 
employer-initiated separation for economic reasons. This benefit has the most comprehensive 
information base; it is the most important contingency; and it is also the most relevant benefit 
from a policy perspective. In most countries the benefit formula is in any case uniform across 
contingencies although in a few benefits differ across contingencies in a complex manner.   
Annex 2 provides detailed information for redundancy benefits at different points of service 
length (1, 5, 10 and 20 years) as well as on the benefit formula (defined benefit and defined 
contribution) for end-of-service benefits for those few countries where they are reported to exist.  
The generosity of severance pay varies strongly across countries and in a manner that is closely 
linked with income level. Almost universally and for all presented length of services, low income 
countries offer the highest and high income countries the lowest level of generosity. Generosity 
is monotonically decreasing for median as well as mean benefit levels. Measured at 1 year of 
service and looking at the median benefit, it amounts to 2.2 weeks for high income countries and 
almost double that (4.3 weeks) for low income countries. For 20 years of service, the mean 
benefit level increases from 37.58 weeks to 68.95 weeks). (Figure 3.5, panel a). The regional 
distribution also reveals unsuspected variance: the highest generosity (except for low-tenured 
workers) is found in Asian countries, followed by Africa, MENA, and Latin America (Figure 
3.5, panel b). Indeed, at the top of the scale (paying 80 weekly wages or more to a worker with 
                                                 
5 In Figures 3.4 to 3.6, the numbers in red are the mean values, those in green the median values (Quartile 2).  The 
box contains 50% of the data. The box size is therefore defined by the Inter-Quartile Range (IQR), the difference 
between Quartile 1 and Quartile 3. The whiskers (upper and lower bars out of the box) are defined as 1.5 times the 
IQR in both directions.  See http://www.statmethods.net/graphs/boxplot.html and McGill (1978). 
1620 years of service) are 14 African countries, 11 Asian countries, 8 Latin American countries, 4 
MENA countries and 2 OECD countries (Portugal and Turkey). One of the most costly systems  
is offered in Sri Lanka, with the maximum amounts in 2001-02 reaching 36-50 monthly wages 
(see Box 3.1) and currently standing at 169 weekly wages for redundancy pay (some 40+ 
monthly wages). On the other end of the spectrum – offering the least generous severance pay – 
are transition countries (this conclusion does not hold for low-tenured workers, who in transition 
economies are entitled to higher severance pay than in other groupings). 
 
Figure 3.5a&b: Severance Pay Generosity by Length of Service 
(a) by country’ income levels  (b) by regions 


































n =  34 n =  43 n =  40 n =  32
median =  31.4 median =  45.8 median =  30.05 median =  24
mean =  68.95 mean =  55.9 mean =  36.94 mean =  37.58
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median =  4.3 median =  4.3 median =  3.35 median =  2.2
















































































































































n =  25 n =  24 n =  12 n =  24 n =  21 n =  43
median =  17.3 median =  22.4 median =  75.8 median =  50 median =  50 median =  33.6
mean =  21.84 mean =  31.01 mean =  57.16 mean =  53.85 mean =  65.74 mean =  64.63




































n =  25 n =  24 n =  12 n =  24 n =  21 n =  43
median =  8.7 median =  9.35 median =  11.95 median =  13.15 median =  17.3 median =  9.8
mean =  10.2 mean =  10.51 mean =  12.43 mean =  14.83 mean =  18.84 mean =  14.28
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median =  4.3 median =  2.55 median =  2.6 median =  2.6 median =  4.3 median =  2













































































































Source: Annex 2 
 
Another way of looking at the generosity of severance pay is to examine the ratio of the number 
of weekly wages paid per year of service. For such a Severance Pay Generosity Index we 
aggregate the benefit schedule by average benefit levels at 1, 5 and 10 years of service and 
normalize by the years of service.
6 Hence a value of larger than 2 signifies that on average a 
                                                 
6 Clearly the choice of years of service is arbitrary and the equal weight biases the result compared to empirical 
weights reflecting actual distribution of benefit payment by service length.  This information, however, is not 
available. 
17worker with equal probability to be made redundant after 1, 5 and 10 years of service would 
expect to receive more than 2 weeks of wage for each year worked (Figure 3.6a&b). 
For low-income countries the generosity index is 3.46 and falls gradually to 2.81 for lower 
middle, 2.73 for higher middle income, and 1.84 for high income countries, if measured at mean 
benefit level. Measured at median level the fall with income level is less pronounced, except for 
high-income countries.  Across regions, the highest average value can be found for transition 
economies (3.27) followed by Africa (2.97) and the lowest in OECD (2.12) if measured at mean 
value, and LAC (2.5) and MNA (2.45) versus OECD (0.7) if measured at median value (Figure 
3.6, panel b).Another aspect of the generosity is the mandated maximum amount of the 
severance pay. The available evidence suggests that the maximum severance pay benefit in some 
countries may reflect any number of years (say 40 month salary for 40 years); yet this is more the 
exception than the rule. The service limits in the benefit formula are typically much lower. 
It has to be emphasized that the severance pay benefit levels presented above do not include 
seniority premiums. That is, additional payments required to be paid in some countries in cases 
of non-fault dismissals (dismissal “without just cause,” which typically include separations for 
economic reasons). Such payments are quite common in Latin American countries (Brazil, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Panama and Peru). Note that such an additional compensation has a clear 
connotation of a penalty for a firm, which means it can be closely associated with the job 
protection function of the severance pay program (see Section 4.1 on different hypotheses about 
the economic rationale for severance pay programs). 
 
Box 3.1: Costs of Sri Lanka’s severance pay system 
Sri Lanka’s severance pay system imposes one of the highest costs internationally.  It not only provides 
extremely high compensation to laid off workers and inflicts correspondingly high costs on employers, but its 
discretionary nature and non-transparency impose additional costs by generating uncertainty about the ability 
to lay off workers (the government has the authority to reject employer’s demands) and lengthy procedures. 
The Termination of Employment of Workman Act (TEWA) of 1971 requires employers with more than 15 
workers to inform the Commissioner of Labor about their intended layoffs – and obtain the Commissioner’s 
authorization for doing so (for each individual case, not only for mass layoffs).  The act requires that the 
request is examined and response provided within three months, but it does not determine the compensation 
to be provided for the laid off workers. In addition, there is another severance payment called gratuity 
(Gratuity Act No. 12 of 1983) paid by employers.  Companies with more than 15 employees have to pay 
gratuity to all workers upon termination of their employment, provided that they have more than 5 years of 
services with the employer.  Gratuity payments amount to one month salary for each 2 years of service.    
In practice, the level of compensation under TEWA approved by the Commissioner has been up to a 
maximum of 6 monthly wages per year of service, and the average was 1.6 and 3.1 monthly wages per year of 
service in 2000 and 2001, respectively (ILO, 2003).  The total sums paid out to laid off workers have been 
large, with the maximum amounting to 36-50 months of wages (ILO, 2003).  Moreover, the time needed for 
processing the Commissioner’s request has been unpredictable, taking on average 6 months, and  sometimes 
much more. What is more, the procedure has usually involved hearings, where employers explained their 
financial performance and business plans to government bureaucrats to justify the layoffs. 
Source: Vodopivec (2004). 
18Figure 3.6a&b: Severance Pay Generosity Index 
(a) by country’ income level  (b) by regions 
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n =  25 n =  35 n =  16 n =  27 n =  32 n =  46
median =  2.2 median =  0.7 median =  2.45 median =  2.5 median =  2.05 median =  2.15
mean =  3.28 mean =  2.12 mean =  2.13 mean =  2.65 mean =  2.65 mean =  2.97  
Source:  Annex 2 
Funding.  The country review indicates that most countries rely on internal flow financing for 
the funding of severance pay, with only a few allowing for or requesting that book reserves be 
established. Cash flow financing is 100 percent in low income countries and decreases broadly 
with increasing income level of the countries. Book reserves are currently limited to Japan and, 
as an option, to South Korea among high income countries and to Poland among high-middle 
income countries); see Figure 3.6, panel a. In the past, firms in a few other countries and 
circumstances were obliged to create book reserves for future severance pay expenses (in Austria 
before the 2003 reform, Italy ongoing after the 2007 reform for firms with less than 50 
employees, South Korea before the 2005 reform, and Venezuela with a continued option for 
internal and external funding), and/or reinsure their payments with insurance companies (in 
Chile and South Korea). A small number of countries have also set up public guarantee funds to 
compensate, at least partly, the severance pay claims of workers whose employers are insolvent 
(typically, such funds also compensate workers for unpaid wages). According to our 
documentation, these funds exist in Austria and Chile (for the workers under the old severance 
pay regime), and a number of other middle to high countries in Europe, Latin America and Asia.  
These countries include Colombia, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Romania, Slovenia, 
South Korea, and Thailand. These guaranteed funds typically are funded by contributions by 
employers and organized at national level. In Italy, the end-of-service pay provisioned with firms 
is guaranteed by the social security fund. 
External funding through individual accounts or centralized funds is limited to a small but 
growing number of middle to high income countries, with individual accounts concentrated in 
upper middle-income and a few high income countries (Figure 3.7, panel a).  In these countries, 
firms (and sometimes workers themselves) are obliged by law to deposit severance pay 
19contributions in individual savings accounts of workers.  These deposits then earn interest and 
are paid out either as a lump-sum or in monthly payments, subject to continuing eligibility. This 
is the case in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela, and since 2003, also in Austria (on 
the Austrian and Chilean reforms, see next section). 
In some countries, employers are required to pay contributions to a centralized fund (Northern 
Africa, Barbados). The contribution rates of employers (levied on gross wages) range from a low 
of 0.5 percent in Barbados and Morocco to about 2.5 percent in Algeria, Chile, and Egypt, to 8 
percent in Colombia and Peru, and to 17 percent in Venezuela. Government discretionary 
support is available in many OECD and transition countries. 
Figure 3.7a&b: Funding Methods 
(a) by country’ income level  (b) by regions 
Shares of respective funding method 
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Source: Annex 2 
Taxation rules.  Information on taxation is difficult to collect and we obtained information on 
only 1/3 of the applicable 152 countries. The available and perhaps unrepresentative information 
suggests major differences across income levels and especially across regions. Across income 
levels, about 50 percent of countries fully tax severance pay, almost 40 percent of lower middle 
income and a small share of high income countries make these benefits tax exempt (Figure 3.8, 
panel a). The tax treatment is quite diverse across regions. In transition economies, almost 90 
percent of benefits are fully taxed while in Latin America 100 percent are partially taxed. In 
OECD close to 50 percent of the countries tax fully and the rest partially, while Asia and Africa, 
full taxation never takes place and in 50 percent of the African countries and 40 percent of the 
Asian countries benefits are tax exempt (as are, often, old-age income benefits). 
20Figure 3.8a&b: Taxation Rules 
(a) by country’ income level  (b) by regions 







































































Source: Annex 2 
To summarize, the above review showed that countries use widely different approaches when 
providing severance pay but the vast majority uses current revenues to finance severance pay 
expenditure. High-income/OECD countries tend to use less generous systems, require more 
demanding prior employment eligibility conditions, often allow any reason for separation, and 
rely much more on collective-agreement based systems. The inverse relation between income 
level of a country and severance pay generosity is very pronounced and valid at different lengths 
of service.  In the vast majority of countries, severance pay is financed from the firm’s cash flow. 
Few countries require firms to create book reserves and/or reinsure their payments with 
insurance companies, and very few have set up public guarantee funds. 
The desk-review of legal provisions in this Section as well as the analysis of incidence and 
generosity of severance pay in Section 4.2 fall clearly short of a comprehensive investigation of 
the impact of severance pay in developing countries:  To what extent is the mandate evaded and 
encourage informal employment and not income and job protection?; to what extent is the 
mandate reneged by partial or full non-compliance from the employer?; for the severance pay 
disbursed, what is the impact on poverty, labor supply, etc of the individual and household?; etc, 
etc.  There are piecemeal indications for the relevance of all of these and other topics that must 
be left to future research.  
3.3 Reform  directions 
For the severance pay inventory we gathered also information about recent reforms undertaken.  
This is to supplement latest cross country information with a sense of recent changes and 
emerging reform directions.  In short, most countries undertook no or only minor parametric 
reforms since the 1990s.
7  Since the early 2000 a few upper middle to high income countries 
have engaged in interesting and partly innovative reforms:  Chile (2002 and 2008), Austria 
(2003), Italy (2004 and 2007), Korea (2005). 
                                                 
7 The inventory on policy reforms profited tremendously from the input and review by a team of Tower Watson 
Uruguay (Maximiliano Sosa, Jessica Gerpe, Rodrigo Baudo). All errors and missed reforms, however, remain our 
responsibility. 
21The Chilean reform of October 2002 introduces an innovative scheme that combines the 
effectiveness of risk pooling with the increased incentive neutrality of individual accounts. 
Under this scheme, dependent workers contribute into two funds: a fund formed by pure 
individual accounts and a solidarity fund. For temporary workers, the full 3% are paid by the 
employer; for non-temporary workers the employee pays 0.6%, the employer 2.4% of which 
1.6% go to the individual account and 0.8% to the solidarity fund (Acevedo, Eskenazi and Pages, 
2006; Bernstein, Fajnzylber and Gana, 2011). In case of unemployment they can have access to 
their own savings but, under some circumstances, they can complement them with resources 
provided by the solidarity fund in order to finance 5 monthly payments, defined as a percentage 
of their previous wage. In this context, the initial use of own funds can be interpreted as a 
deductible for accessing the solidarity fund, therefore providing a self-policing mechanism.  
The experience during its first 8 years has been positive in terms of coverage and sustainability. 
The accumulated experience over this period allowed the government to introduce in May 2009 a 
set of reforms designed to improve the adequacy of benefits by facilitating access to the pooled 
component. Current welfare evaluations (Bernstein, Contreras, and Benvin, 2008) suggest that, 
in general, most workers value positively the presence of the program, even if their valuation 
depend on their level of risk aversion and the type of labor history,   Risk averse, older or more 
educated individuals will benefit more from the consumption smoothing properties, whereas 
Chilean women are less likely to benefit from the program, as their labor histories are more 
interrupted than those of men. Evaluations of the system in terms of labor incentives are 
currently underway (see, Bernstein, Fajnzylber and Gana, 2011).  Very significantly, efficiency 
effects produced by this unique and innovative system indeed seem to conform to the 
expectations, as found by the recent study by Reyes, van Ours, and Vodopivec (2010).  For 
beneficiaries using the solidarity fund, the pattern of job finding rates over the duration of 
unemployment is consistent with moral hazard effects, while for beneficiaries relying on 
unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISAs) only, the pattern is free of such effects. The 
authors also find that for benefit recipients not entitled to use the solidarity fund SF, the amount 
of accumulation on the UISA does not affect the exit rate from unemployment, suggesting that 
such individuals internalize the costs of unemployment benefits. 
Overall, the new scheme seems to have been a success and has largely avoided the distortions 
that plague unemployment insurance systems.  The 2009 reform focused on four aspects 
(Bernstein et al. 2011): (i) an increase in coverage of the solidarity fund observed since the 
implementation of the scheme; (ii) an increase in the low level of replacement rates; (iii) a 
change in the investment regime more in line with futures of the unemployment insurance 
members; and (iv) improvement in coverage of nonmonetary benefits (i.e. job search and re-
training).  Yet, in parallel with this scheme, Chile keeps both mandated and quasi-mandated 
severance pay schemes for dismissal and redundancy, with no known plans for integrating the 
former into the savings accounts. 
For all new labor contracts and for voluntary changers, the Austrian reform of 2003 (Koman, 
Schuh and Weber, 2005; Hofer, Schuh and Walch, 2011) moves the traditional severance pay 
toward an occupational pension cum income support for those dismissed with longer tenure.  The 
severances pay entitlements of workers who are eligible under the old program remains 
unchanged.  
The reform of the severance pay scheme had been a topic of a controversial reform discussion 
for some time.  Trade unions wanted an extension of entitlement to voluntary separations and 
22seasonal employment.  There was general view that the old severance pay program damaged 
labor mobility.  The goal of the government was to transform the severance pay into a new 
occupational pension scheme which should be the second pillar (in European and World Bank 
count) of a multi-pillar pension scheme. 
Under the new scheme which started on January 1
st, 2003, coverage and entitlement is 
substantially increased as enrolment starts with the first day of employment. The scheme also 
applies to temporary workers and is not dependent on the form of contract termination.   
Employers have to pay a contribution 1.5377 percent of payroll into a fund, specified by an 
agreement between employer and worker council, and licensed by financial market authority, 
which handles the administration and asset management. The maximum charge by an 
administrator is 3.5 percent of the yearly contribution revenue. 
If dismissed by the employer with  tenure exceeding  3 years, the employee can choose between 
a lump-sum payment of the accumulated amount or continued saving toward a future pension.  In 
case of a voluntary quit or job tenure shorter than 3 years, no lump-sum payments will be 
received, but the acquired claim remains and can be transferred to the fund of the new employer.  
This differential treatment by the type of separation (dismissal or voluntary quit) and the length 
of tenure (below and above 3 years) has a social benefit objective:  it provides potential income 
support for the dismissed with long tenure, but it keeps money for future retirement for voluntary 
leavers and the short-term employed. 
The second-pillar pension or unemployment insurance benefit dimension is also visible in the 
benefit payout option.  If withdrawn as a lump sum payment, the (low) tax rate of 6 percent for 
this type of employer sponsored benefit is applied.  However, if the benefit is disbursed in 
monthly installments (including annuities bought at retirement), no tax will be levied. 
Simulations based on administrative individual records for the period 1984-2001 suggest that the 
new rules are less generous, and that the contribution rate may be too low to generate significant 
benefits (Koman et al, 2005).  Experience since reform also suggests that frequent withdrawals 
of funds after job termination substantially reduces potential funds for retirement income (Hofer 
et al., 2011).  This phenomenon has been accentuated (or perhaps motivated) by the low level of 
remuneration achieved by the funds.  The latter is claimed to be linked to the capital guarantees 
the funds need to provide.  Econometric investigations suggest that the new scheme changes 
little the job mobility or, put differently, the old scheme may have had little detrimental effect. 
Overall, the performance of the new scheme has been modest.  This may be due to design issues 
of the new scheme (withdraw rules, capital guarantee, low contribution rate) but may also reflect 
limited improvements in incentives over the prior scheme.  The discussion about a further reform 
has been side tracked by the recent crisis. 
The Italian severance pay system (2004 and 2007 reforms) has a number of particularities; some 
claim that severance pay as conventionally understood actually does not exist (e.g. Garibaldi and 
Pacelli, 2004). In effect there are 2 schemes that do not fall not squarely under severance pay as 
known in other countries.  The first scheme (tutela obbligatoria) provides a dismissal 
compensation for unfair termination and distinguishes between firms (actually establishments):  
small firms with 15 and less employees, and larger firms with 16 and more.  Once a court rules 
that a worker is unfairly dismissed, smaller firms have to pay 2.5 to 6 months of wage as 
compensation.  Larger firms have to reinstate the employee who can, however, select 15 months 
23wage compensation.  The economic interpretation of severance pay emerges as courts reportedly 
often judge in favor of the employee. 
The second severance pay is an end-of-service pay (Tratamento de Fine Rapporte, TFR) that is 
available upon separation from the firm or before if they have tenure of at least 8 years or if the 
employer agrees. This can be used for health related expenditure, buying a house, or for specific 
periods of unpaid leave. For each year of service, a provision of two twenty-seventh (or 1/13.5) 
of the gross yearly wage is included in the individual TFR account with the firm and revalued 
yearly with a factor of 1.5% fixed plus 75% of the CPI inflation of the previous year.  In effect, 
the employee provides a loan to the firm that he can use for selective events before separation, 
after separation and perhaps unemployment or eventual retirement.  
Public policy changes over the last decade have been geared toward strengthening the retirement 
component with pension reforms that have and will reduce benefit levels under the public 
scheme in the background.  To this end, in 2004 the government provided an option to enroll into 
a supplementary pension scheme in return to giving up their TFR for new labor market entrants 
and also older workers were encouraged to enroll. While such a selection cannot be reversed, 
those workers staying with the old system can reconsider their choice at any moment. To support 
such a choice and strengthen supplementary pensions the law of 2004 made a number of radical 
innovations (Casare et al, 2008): making the participation the default option for severance pay; 
favorable taxation of benefits whether paid as lump sum or annuity, and changes in contribution, 
benefit, advances, redemption and portability.  By 2007, the Italian government decided that 
companies with 50 and more employees must shift the new flow of severance pay contributions 
to itself and the government will pay the benefits directly no matter the decision by the employee 
(Corsini et al, 2010). 
So far fiscal and other incentives have had limited effects.  By the end 2008 only 26 percent of 
eligible workers had signed-up for the supplementary pension scheme.  The explanations range 
from temporary effects due to the financial crisis to systemic ones, including the credibility of 
supplementary schemes and liquidity preferences by workers. A number of economists are 
worried about the liquidity and broader economic effects for small and medium sized enterprises 
as they are losing access to cheap internal financing (Calcagno et al. 2007).     
The Korean severance pay reform of 2005 initiated a voluntary conversion of an end-of-service 
pay scheme into an occupational pension system with the objective of replacing an unfunded 
scheme that pays lump-sum benefits with a funded system that provides an annuity after 
retirement (Yun and Hur, 2011).  The original severance pay scheme, introduced in 1953 and 
made mandatory in 1961, had the objective of income support for both the unemployed and 
retirees at a time when neither an unemployment benefit nor a pension system existed.  A 
mandated defined benefit pension plan was introduced in 1988 and an unemployment insurance 
system in 1995.  The generosity of the pension scheme was reduced after the financial crisis of 
1997-1998 when it became clear that the system will not be sustainable despite the increasing 
reserves due to incomplete system maturation.  The first old-age pension benefits were paid in 
2008. 
With the 2005 reform, employees and employers could either continue their severance pay 
scheme by mutual consensus or start a corporate pension system (defined contribution or defined 
benefit). Under the corporate pension system, employees forgo withdrawing benefits before 
separation (as allowed under severance pay scheme) except for a housing purchase or long-term 
24care.  Furthermore, the rate of return is dependent on the performance of financial institutions 
with which the pension scheme is established (e.g. asset management companies, insurance 
companies and banks);  under the severance pay scheme the implicit rate of return is the 
individual wage growth.  
The take-up of the new scheme is considered disappointingly low. As of November 2010, about 
2 million out of 7.7 million eligible workers have joined the corporate pension scheme, i.e. some 
26 percent. In order to motivate a stronger conversion toward corporate pensions, the corporate 
tax act was reformed at the beginning of 2011 and the tax deductibility of the employer’s 
contributions was limited to external funding. Before employers enjoyed tax privileges when 
reserving for severance pay commitments with book reserves. 
In summary, the reform examples of Chile, Austria, Italy and Korea have a number of 
commonalities: 
  All countries have unemployment schemes that provide income support for the dismissed 
and comprehensive pension schemes whose generosity is scheduled to fall.  This reduces 
the need for severance pay as consumption smoothing device for the unemployed while 
offering the opportunity to use the resources for strengthening supplementary pension 
pillar.  This was part of the reform consideration behind their reforms.   
  The willingness by individuals to forgo access to liquidity during working life is 
seemingly limited as inferred by the limited roll-over in Austria and funded scheme 
selection in Italy and Korea.  This liquidity preference is likely to be influenced by the 
low rates of return offered by the funded provisions which may reflect the recent 
financial crisis, the status of their financial market development, and the continued 
dominance by the banking system. 
  Labor market considerations had a limited role in the reform motivation, as the effect in 
any case is likely to have been small (Austria) or non-existing (Italy).  Labor market 
considerations seem to have been absent for the Korean reform. 
Let us conclude this chapter with a comment on the political economy of severance pay reforms.  
Reducing job protection for formal sector workers is politically difficult, to say the least, and 
often meets with stiff resistance from ‘insiders’ because it increases the prospects of layoffs and 
dismissals from previously protected jobs. Yet many countries have taken this difficult step (for 
example, transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe). The introduction of well designed, 
cost-effective active and passive labor market programs that provide more efficient protection to 
workers in the long run (in lieu of protection of jobs) and that help allaying the short term 
political costs of reforms has proved instrumental in achieving this policy shift.
8 But the 
necessary and sufficient ingredients for such change are far from being well-known: for example, 
despite continual efforts of employers, Sri Lanka’s severance pay – one of the most restrictive 
severance pay systems in the world, see above – has not reduced its generosity and procedural 
                                                 
8 During the early transition of Eastern European countries, reductions in job protection were accompanied by the 
active and passive programs to ease restructuring/layoffs. While the programs were initially generous and increased 
fiscal costs, their generosity was significantly reduced over time, as the goals of the restructuring agenda were met, 
though reducing entitlements was difficult (see Vodopivec, Wörgötter and Raju 2005)  
 
25complexity, and in fact, several changes in the last decade have, if anything, even increased its 
generosity (see Box 3.2). 
 
Box 3.2: Political economy complexities of reforming several pay program 
 
Sri Lanka’s strict severance pay regulations (embodied in the Termination of Employment of 
Workmen Act No. 45 of 1971) were enacted at a time when Sri Lanka was pursuing inward-
looking economic policies, characterized by an import-substitution industrialization policy, 
stringent exchange controls, price controls of many commodities, and a program of 
nationalization of a wide-range of establishments.  The TEWA was intended to arrest the rising 
rate of unemployment which resulted from these policies, as many industries could not operate in 
the restrictive environment and had to reduce or retrench workers.  Moving the second reading of 
the TEWA Bill in the legislature, the then Minister of Labour explained that “…. the intention in 
creating this law is not to put employers into difficulty, but solely, to prevent the loss of 
employment of workers for unreasonable or frivolous reasons. Where employers who face 
justifiable difficulties – for example, the shortage of raw materials – and need to terminate the 
services of workers, the Commissioner of Labour has an opportunity to intervene and, after 
discussing with other departments and Ministries, and take some remedial action relevant to both 
employer and workers to prevent the reduction in the strength of the organization or of the 
workforce.” 
 
The intention of the TEWA was clearly to prevent or discourage mass retrenchment situations, 
rather than individual terminations.  However, the statute as enacted did not carry such a 
limitation, and terminations other than those intended initially are even now covered under the 
TEWA. Both the fact that the generosity at the introduction was increased above the intention of 
the government, as well as the persistence of the generosity of the program despite several 
changes of the TEWA act, witness the political economy complexities of changing regulations 
that benefit only the minority of workers (about two thirds of Sri Lanka’s workforce works in the 
informal sector) given the presence of strong, well organized trade unions. 
 
Sources: Ranaraja (2006) 
 
264.  The Motivation behind Severance Pay: Reviewing Hypothesis and Evidence 
The purpose of this section is to examine severance pay programs as part of a broader 
institutional framework, thereby also stimulating further research. To this end this section starts 
out with proposals for the economic rationale of severance pay, after which some simple cross-
country regressions are reported using our data inventory. As the data do not allow for testing the 
efficiency effects of severance pay, the section closes with a brief and selective review of the 
empirical literature. 
4.1   The Economic Rationale of Severance Pay 
The few papers about the origins of severance pay and the still limited but rising theoretical and 
empirical literature on this topic suggest three main hypotheses about the economic rationale of 
severance payments. First, severance payments are a primitive form of social benefits which pre-
date or complement existing benefits for unemployment and retirement. Second, severance 
payments are designed to be an efficiency enhancing human resource instrument, be it as an ad 
hoc support to large-scale enterprise restructuring or a more permanent device tightening existing 
bonds between workers and firms, in order to reduce the transaction costs and the loss of firm-
specific knowledge and skills due to turnover. Lastly, while severance payments may have these 
income protection and/or efficiency objectives, they also function as a job protection instrument, 
a function that gained importance over time and a life of its own. 
The three hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and may apply concurrently. In some instances, 
the severance pay mandate is surely focused on one objective.  In other instances, programs may 
cater to multiple objectives. Only in-depth case studies and more advanced empirical studies are 
likely to disentangle these multiple motives. We hope that these preliminary econometric efforts 
provide a motivation for further efforts.  
(i)  Severance payment as a primitive social benefit program 
As described above, severance pay came into existence in the absence of other forms of social 
safety nets as an employer-sponsored benefit program providing compensation for (unfair) 
dismissals.  At the very beginning, employers have simply paid severance pay to compensate 
workers for not respecting the customary advance dismissal notice. Later, and during periods of 
large scale restructuring, additional cash compensation was added to provide an employer 
financed safety net (as public systems were minimal or did not exist). In some cases (e.g. UK), 
voluntary severance benefits have been provided to “top-up”  low, flat rate unemployment 
insurance/assistance benefits. In many countries mandated or quasi-mandated severance 
payments pre-dated public old-age retirement provisions as they were paid to individuals at a 
certain advanced age and made independent of the employer’s actions.  
This obvious link between severance pay and social benefits emerges both in policy discussion 
as well as in theoretical models and empirical analyses.  As noted above, at the policy level, the 
provision of severance pay was “subject to this obligation coming to an end on the promulgation 
of legislation concerning social insurance (Costa Rica) or to the replacement of compensation by 
benefits from a welfare fund” (Dominican Republic, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria; see Herz (1954: 
319).  This speaks in favor of a substitution of severance pay by social benefit programs covering 
similar risks, i.e. unemployment and old-age.  If no substitution takes place - that is severance 
payments are not reduced or phased-out once unemployment and old-age benefits are introduced 
- then one needs to look into other explanations, including political power exerted by trade 
27unions, or differences in the instruments as they correspond to different risks or needs.  For 
example Pissarides (2001) shows that the introduction of severance payments may provide 
insurance against income risk when moral hazard or other frictions prevent unemployment 
insurance from providing sufficient coverage.  In such circumstances, severance pay could 
provide perfect insurance against the uncertainty of job protection.   
(ii)  Severance pay as efficiency enhancing human resource instrument 
A second set of explanations for the existence of severance payments sees them as instruments 
for managing human resources in an enterprise.  In a short-term perspective, severance pay reacts 
to the need for enterprise restructuring by providing compensation that make (mass) dismissals 
socially and politically more palatable.  According to the historic evidence, such considerations 
were clearly present at the time of main technological changes since the late 19
th century and 
they continue to today.  Under such circumstances, severance pay programs are motivated by 
human resources management concerns such as preserving morale of remaining workers and 
avoiding potential damage caused by departing workers if they are not appropriately 
compensated. 
Under the human resource rationale, severance pay becomes an efficiency wage instrument 
keeping workers within the firm and nurturing productive worker relationship, for example by 
avoiding losses of firm-specific knowledge and skills and the transaction costs associated with  
frequent hiring (Lazear 1990).  By withholding part of the wage from the employee till he or she 
retires (or is fired), enterprises want to make sure that individuals with valuable firm-specific 
knowledge and skills are less likely to quit or to sell their transferable human capital to a 
competing firm.  In a similar direction, severance pay may provide incentives for employed 
workers to invest in firm specific human capital or contribute more in the work place.  In 
particular, longer-lasting employment is conducive to instilling trust, cooperation, and loyalty 
between the employer and workers. It also encourages team spirit among workers, which may 
contribute to higher productive efficiency and reduce the resistance of workers to the 
introduction of new technologies (OECD, 1999). 
Suedekum and Ruehman (2003) demonstrate that two opposing forces may be at work: On the 
one hand the positive incentive effects due to job protection, and on the other hand the lethargy 
effect of the potential firing does not contain the same strong penalty (unless those dismissed 
“for cause” are ineligible for benefits).  Alvarez and Verarcierto (2001) show in a model with 
contractual and reallocation frictions that the introduction of severance payments may result in 
Pareto-improvement. 
(iii)  Severance pay as employment protection device 
While the first two rationales for severance pay – social benefits and human resource instrument 
– suggest positive returns to this instrument, they are not well researched or empirically 
validated.  This contrasts with the notion of severance pay as job protection, which carries a 
negative connotation with economists (but is a worthy objective to many others). The theoretical 
impact of employment protection on labor market outcomes and efficiency is ambiguous. This is 
echoed in the ambiguous and often puzzling empirical results (see Boeri, 1999, and Addison and 
Teixeira, 2000 and 2004, see also section 4.2 below). 
Severance pay as employment protection (not income protection) arises from the additional costs 
of separation that mandated severance brings to job separations.  Firing costs emerge from the 
28mandated benefits, the permitted causes (say on personal and economic grounds), and ruling by 
the courts on what is fair dismissal. 
Under such a rationale, mandated termination (or end-of-service) payments that are due 
regardless of the reasons of separation and thus do not contribute to job protection, should not be 
considered under the umbrella of severance pay.  Such programs are retained earnings which 
belong to the employee and are thus a credit from the employee to the enterprise.  Garibaldi and 
Pacelli (2004), however, demonstrate based on the Italian case and in a small partial equilibrium 
dynamic model that some of the labor market effects of such termination payments are fully 
comparable to those of a firing tax or a severance pay with wage rigidity. 
How are the three postulated economic rationales for severance pay borne out by empirical facts? 
Below we shed light on this question, both by providing econometric results based on basic but 
widely accepted specifications and by reviewing the empirical findings in the literature. In our 
econometric investigation we focus primarily on the first hypothesis – severance pay as a social 
benefit payment – by examining factors behind the incidence and generosity of the severance 
pay. Human resource features of severance pay are more likely to emerge from collective and 
voluntary provisions on which we have little information. The job protection interpretation of the 
severance pay has been extensively researched by others, so we provide a brief summary of their 
findings. 
4.2  Determinants of the Incidence and Generosity of Severance Pay  
The empirical strategy is as follows. We seek to identify the determinants of the incidence and 
generosity of existing severance pay programs so as to check to what extent these determinants 
are consistent with the above hypotheses about the economic rationales for severance pay. 
Among the explanatory variables we include logarithm of per capita income; the generosity of 
unemployment benefits and pensions; the length of the notice period; and union density. For 
generosity we use the severance pay generosity index presented in Section 3.2 that measures the 
weeks per year of service for an average of 1, 5 and 10 years of tenure. 
The rationale for including the per capita income variable is as follows. According to the 
“development theory” (for an interpretation, see Botero et al, 2002), rich countries impose more 
regulations (including the regulation of job protection) than poor countries because in rich 
countries the benefits of such regulations (fulfillment of social objectives, for example) exceed 
the costs. In contrast, poor countries simply cannot afford the administrative costs nor the 
distortions associated with such regulations. Hence there should be a positive correlation 
between the level of development and the incidence (and generosity) of severance pay. An 
important modification of this link arises once we take into account that the emergence of social 
and private insurance – the emergence which is itself associated with the level of development – 
works against the likelihood and generosity of formal severance pay programs. The above 
reasoning suggests an inverse U-shape relationship between per capita income and both the 
incidence and generosity of formal severance pay programs. Note that the above explanation 
supports, or is at least consistent with, the social benefit and the job protection hypothesis about 
severance pay. 
The above reasoning thus predicts the inverse U-shape relationship between the per capita 
income and both the incidence and generosity of formal severance pay programs. In theory, an 
ideal plot with the severance pay generosity on the y-axis and the (log) per capita GDP on the x-
29axis, would therefore show an upward slope for countries in the lower income group, which then 
slowly flattens for countries in the middle income category, and finally turns into a downward 
slope for high income countries.  
The empirical evidence is broadly but not fully consistent with this assumption with one 
exception. Bivariate associations between severance pay generosity index and (log) per capita 
GDP, shown by trend lines for each income group, suggest a positive association for both, low 
and upper middle income countries, and a negative one for lower-middle and high income 
countries. Figure 4.1 presents the data and estimations with (a, left panel) and without (b, right 
panel) those countries that have zero generosity values, i.e. non-mandated countries. The robust 
linear regression line for all countries has a negative slope for both data sets with a steeper and 
significant descent for the full data set.
9 The negative slope is also consistent with Figure 3.6.  
Overall, data and estimations give some support to a mild inverse U-shaped relationship that is 
evident for the low and high income countries, and equivocal for the middle income countries. 
Figure 4.1a&b* presents an estimation based on a polynomial structure of the per-capita GDP 
variable (including all countries, not separately by income groupings). 
 
Figure 4.1a&b: Generosity of Severance Pay and per-Capita GDP  
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ALL, n = 139
Robust linear
regression line for ALL
 
Source: Own computations based on data presented in Annex 2. 
                                                 
9 The robust estimation excludes extreme values. For details on the estimation and statistical criteria, see Annex 3. 
30Figure 4.1a&b*: Generosity of Severance Pay and per-Capita GDP  
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Source: Own computations based on data presented in Annex 2. 
Before testing the relationship of severance pay and other social benefits, notice period, and 
union density, we want to explore the relationship of these other social policy and labor market 
instruments to the income level of the countries. For the latter we use again the per-capita GDP 
(in logs). Figures 4.2 to 4.4 present these relationships. For the generosity index of 
unemployment benefits we use the available replacement rates for the average income worker; 
for the pension benefits the prospective replacement rate of the average income worker as 
calculated by the OECD APEX model are used. In the benefit case we have two figures each: 
The left panel that includes zero generosity in the case when benefit programs do not exist, and 
the right panel with positive benefit levels only. The notice period is the average number of 
weeks for workers with 1, 5 and 10 years of service from Doing Business 2011. 
Figures 4.2 and 4.3 signal contrasting relationships of generosity and income level, depending on 
the inclusion or exclusion of zero values (i.e. the absence of such a mandated program). And the 
contrasts differ between unemployment and pension benefits. Figure 4.2 plots the relationship 
between the generosity of unemployment benefit systems and income level with and without 
zero values for unemployment benefit generosity (which indicates the absence of a mandated 
program) for those countries that provide the information. The figure on the left panel of Figure 
4.2 already suggests a significant positive relationship with the income level of countries if the 
zero values are included. Once only positive values are considered, this positive relationship 
becomes even stronger (Figure 4.2, right panel) when looking at all data points or only the high 
income group.  The following applies to pension benefits: Strongly positive relationship if also 
zero values are included; mildly negative relationship in case only positive generosity values are 
considered.  
The interpretation is not straight forward but in any case suggests important differences between 
unemployment and pension benefit generosity. Unemployment benefits are clearly less 
widespread and zero generosity reaches into higher income countries. Once countries provide 
unemployment benefits there is a significant positive relationship of generosity and income level 
of a country that may be linked to decreasing informality, better job matching objectives or 
redistributive considerations. 
31Figure 4.2a&b:  Unemployment Benefit Generosity and per-Capita GDP 
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Source: Own computations based on data presented in Annex 2. 
Pension benefits programs are much more wide-spread even if the coverage of the population 
itself is strongly correlated with the income level (see World Bank, 2011)
10. As a result there are 
few upper and only one high income country (Equatorial Guinea) without benefit scheme giving 
rise to the positive slope when all countries for which information is available are considered 
(left panel). Once only positive generosity values are considered (right panel), there is a mildly 
negative yet statistically insignificant relationship with income level, which may be related to the 
level of financial market development and the capacity to substitute mandated (and often 
unfunded) pension schemes with voluntary and funded provisions as income level increases. 
Figure 4.3a&b:  Pension Benefit Generosity and per-Capita GDP 
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Source: Own computations based on data presented in Annex 2. 
                                                 
10 Selected data are available as retrievable spreadsheets in the World Bank’s Social Protection Web-site at 
http://www.worldbank.org/pensions.  
 
32The notice period for dismissals exhibits a positive slope for high and upper middle income 
groups (Figure 4.4). For low and lower middle income groups as well as for the overall robust 
estimation the slope is close to 0, implying no relationship between income and notice period in 
these groups. This is somewhat surprising as lower income countries are often conjectured to 
have more rigid employment protection laws. The positive relationship with the income level for 
higher income economies makes the notice period consistent with efficiency and/or redistributive 
considerations.  
Figure 4.4:  Notice Period (in weeks) and per-Capita GDP 
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Source: Own computations based on data presented in Annex 2. 
To explore the social benefit hypothesis more directly, we examine how the generosity of other 
cash benefit systems – in particular, unemployment benefits and pensions – affects the generosity 
of severance pay. Assuming that other cash benefit systems are substitutes for severance pay, 
introduction of unemployment insurance benefits or the increase of their generosity may lead to a 
reduction of severance pay benefits, thus yielding a negative association between the generosity 
of the two benefit systems (similarly for pensions). Because we do not have historic data, we 
cannot investigate how the introduction of unemployment benefit systems has affected the 
generosity of severance pay.  
Figure 4.5 displays the interactions for the generosity index for severance pay and 
unemployment benefit systems. The regression lines for each income level suggest positive 
associations for the lower and upper middle groups and a negative one for the high income group 
if all countries (including those with zero generosity) are included. The robust linear estimation 
across all countries exhibits a significant negative coefficient (Figure 4.5 left panel). The 
coefficients for each income level are significant as well. If only positive values for benefit 
generosity are considered, the coefficient for high income countries turns zero while the overall 
relationship remains slightly negative. However, for all these models only the intercept remains 
statistically significant. 
33Figure 4.5a&b: Generosity of severance pay vs. unemployment benefit generosity 
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Source: Own computations based on data presented in Annex 2. 
The correlation between the generosity of severance pay and unemployment benefit is positive 
for low income groupings, with rising income level, the correlation becomes less positive. It 
ultimately turns significantly negative for high income countries as well as for all countries (in 
case when countries with zero generosity are included). This is also due to zero (mandated) 
values in high income economies that all offer severance pay via collective agreements. We can 
thus conclude that if there is complementarity between both benefits, the strength of this 
relationship is definitely decreasing with income level and it is turning, apparently, into 
substitutability for higher income countries. The latter seems to imply a shift from a mandated 
severance pay program to severance pay arrangements based on collective agreements. 
A possible overall complementarity of severance pay and unemployment benefits is consistent 
with the results of Parsons (2005a, b, c). Based both on theoretical modeling and empirical 
analysis of the U.S., he also found that severance pay and unemployment insurance are 
complements. Moreover, Parsons (2005a) noted that a study of private severance pay before and 
after the introduction of public unemployment benefits in the 1930s found no evidence of 
crowding out of private severance by public unemployment insurance.   
Figure 4.6a&b suggests that the relationship between the generosity of severance pay and 
pension benefit is weakly positive for all considered country income groups (except for lower 
middle income countries that have, however, a small sample size). As with data for the 
generosity of unemployment benefits, we use replacement rates for average income earner to 
measure the generosity of pension benefit.  The resulting broadly positive associations of 
severance pay and pension benefits are more in line with complementarity between social 
benefits and severance pay generosity across countries.  
34Figure 4.6a&b: Generosity of severance pay vs. pension benefit generosity 
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Robust linear
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lower middle income, n = 8
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ALL, n = 41
Robust linear
regression line for ALL
 
Source: Own computations based on data presented in Annex 2. 
In Figure 4.7a&b we present the association of severance pay generosity and notice period, for 
all countries (left panel) and for those with positive values only (right panel). Again there are 
main differences between the samples and within the samples. If all 181 countries are 
considered, the robust estimation signals a significant negative association and hence 
substitutability between severance pay generosity and notice period. For the sub-groups, 
however, the graph and related estimates signal a change with income level: A high level of 
substitutability for low income countries that turns into mild complementarity for high income 
countries, with middle income countries again providing mixed signals. If only positive values 
(126 countries) are considered, the complementarity aspect dominates except for the high income 
group where we find signs of a mild substitutability. As in the prior cases of all or positive values 
only, there are interesting signals of regime change between the presence and absence of benefit 
programs and regulations that require further investigations.  
Figure 4.7 Severance Pay Generosity and Notice Period 









































high income, n = 48
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ALL, n = 181
Robust linear
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high income, n = 27
upper middle income, n = 32
lower middle income, n = 35
low income, n = 32
ALL, n = 126
Robust linear
regression line for ALL
 
Source: Own computations based on data presented in Annex 2. 
35The inclusion of union density among the explanatory variables allows us to test whether the 
influence of trade unions (as proxied by union coverage) translates into more generous severance 
pay. Note that a positive link between union density and severance pay is consistent with both 
the social benefit and the job protection hypotheses. Bivariate associations between severance 
pay index and union density, shown by trend lines for each income group, suggest negative 
association for low, upper-middle, and high-income countries, and positive association for lower-
middle income countries if all countries are considered (Figure 4.8, left panel). This would be 
largely in contrast to political power theory. However, if only positive generosity values are 
considered then a positive link emerges for all but the low-middle income grouping. This may 
suggest that once a program is established, then unions seem to be able to exert a positive impact 
on generosity that is linked with union density. 
Figure 4.8: Severance Pay Generosity and Union Density 
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Robust linear
regression line for ALL



























































high income, n = 18
upper middle income, n = 12
lower middle income, n = 10
low income, n = 5
ALL, n = 45
Robust linear
regression line for ALL
 
Source: Own computations based on data presented in Annex 2. 
 
We end this subsection by providing multivariate estimates of severance generosity. In the basic 
model we regress the generosity of severance pay on log of per-capita income, the generosity of 
unemployment and pension benefits, the notice period and union density.   
 
G-SP = a + b log (pc-GDP) + c G-UB + d G-PB + e NP + f UD + u 
 
with 
G-SP    Generosity  Index  of  Severance Pay (weeks per year of service) 
Log (pc-GDP)   Logarithm of per-capita GDP (2009, in US$) 
G-UB      Generosity of Unemployment Benefits (replacement rate for av. worker) 
G-PB    Generosity  of  Pension  Benefits (replacement rate for av. worker) 
NP      Notice period (in weeks) 
UD      Union Density (share of unionized labor in work force) 
u    Residual 
In an extended model we introduce additional variables that try to assess if benefit regimes (e.g. 
unemployment insurance vs. assistance, or PAYG vs. funded pensions), country income 
groupings, or regions exert significant influence. 
36Controlling for different explanatory variables at the same time should enhance confidence in 
our estimates. However, not all variables are available for all countries which reduces the sample 
size as we add more variables.   
The basic model for all values, across separate and simultaneous estimations suggests the 
following results (see Table 4.1): 
  a consistently negative and significant impact of per-capita GDP on severance pay 
generosity 
  a consistently negative impact of unemployment benefit generosity that is only weakly 
significant in some models 
  a consistently positive and mostly significant impact of pension benefit generosity 
  an inconsistent and never significant impact of notice period 
  a consistently negative but only sporadically significant impact of union density 
Adding further variables to the basic model does not typically change the sign of the coefficients 
but often renders them insignificant.  The explanatory power is often, but not always, taken over 
by the income grouping as well as the regional dummies (results not shown). The significance is 
increased once robust estimation is undertaken.  Other specifications and estimations (e.g. using 
a probit approach or polynomial specification of the income term – with and without log) did not 
lead to improvements in the results. For further details on the estimation, see Annex 3. 
Applying the basic model to positive values only reduces the number of observations to 19 and 
renders all coefficients, except for the per-capita income, insignificant. The change in signs, 
however, is consistent with the observations in the figures above and a regime change between 
all generosity and positive generosity values only. For example an increase in union density is 
consistent with the conjectured increase in generosity of severance pay. 
In summing-up this subsection, the following tentative results are suggested.  They serve as an 
amuse-gueule for further and more details investigations and estimations: 
  The Figures in Section 3 and Subsection 4.2, and the estimations across all models 
suggest a strongly negative and significant link between severance pay generosity and 
per-capita income (or economic wellbeing of a country). A mild inverse U-shaped 
relation to income has limited statistical support. Furthermore, high income countries 
have much less tendency to mandate severance pay, instead leaving it to contractual 
agreements at the sector or firm level. 
  The results are broadly consistent with the social benefit view of severance pay and with 
substitutability with unemployment benefits. But the data suggest a changing function 
across the income level of countries with stark complementarity for low income countries 
that is gradually reduced until it turns toward substitutability for high income countries. 
  In contrast, the associations with pension benefits do not confirm the social policy 
function of severance pay. The two benefits seem to be complementary across country 
income levels, and this relationship is robust and mostly significant. Hence, as in the case 
studies of Austria, Italy and Korea, the transformed severance pay may serve to 
complement potentially reduced future pension benefits but such a reduction does not 
emerge from the cross-country estimations. 
37Table 4.1: Drivers of Generosity of Severance Pay:  Results for Basic Model 
Model 1 2 3  4  5 6 7 8 9 10 
(Intercept) 
4.80***  4.36**  2.24***  7.71***  1.83***  8.79***  3.09***  5.03***  2.43***  7.29** 
(0.96) (1.45) (0.25)  (1.10)  (0.47) (1.88) (0.42) (0.95) (0.34) (2.13) 
log. GDP per 
capita 
-0.32**  -0.28  -0.78***  -0.65**  -0.31**  -0.59* 




-0.003  -0.017*  -0.03 




0.03***  0.01  0.03*** 
(0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) 
Union 
Density 
-0.02  -0.03  -0.02* 




-0.05  -0.05  0.10 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
R-squared  0.10  0.11  0.07  0.40  0.02  0.41  0.12  0.11  0.01  0.69 
adj. R-
squared  0.09 0.09 0.06  0.38  0.01 0.39 0.11 0.10 0.01 0.64 
N  175  153  157  80  81  63  64  175  181  39 
Source: Authors estimates 
Notes: Asterisks (*, **, ***) signal significance at 10, 5 and 1% error interval; values in brackets below the 
coefficients depict the standard deviation; N the number of observations. 
  There is no consistent and statistically significant link between severance pay generosity 
and notice period. The bivariate analysis hints at substitutability if zero and positive 
values are considered and at complementarity for positive values only, although this 
result may be a spurious. 
  The relationship between severance pay generosity and trade union density is mostly 
negative, with stable and at times significant parameters.  Such a result is at odds with a 
power theory of trade unions and generosity. Again, a bivariate analysis hints at 
substitutability if zero and positive values are considered and to complementarity for 
positive values only. 
  Last but not least, the use of regional dummies suggests homogeneity within regions and 
variation between regions, but mainly between OECD and Non-OECD countries. 
Regional effects of reforms with innovators and followers may have been at work for 
severance pay programs; there are strong indications for such processes in the area of 
pensions (see Orenstein, 2003). 
  
384.3  Brief Review of the Efficiency Effects of Severance Pay  
Another way to explore the economic rationale of severance pay is by examining the established 
empirical effects of severance pay by other researchers. If they show that severance pay 
increases efficiency, that would yield support to the human resource management hypothesis; in 
the opposite case, the evidence would support the job protection hypothesis. The problem is, 
however, that very few investigations exist that measure the impact of severance pay on labor 
market outcome directly and in a convincing manner. Empirical studies are typically of cross-
country type and hence little robust and methodologically reliable. Furthermore, most of the 
studies focus on broader job protection indicators and measurement and hence a mingling of the 
effects. 
We are not aware of direct empirical evidence on the positive effects of severance pay on firm 
productivity (based on firm-level data). Nickell and Layard (1999) find a positive effect of 
employment protection on aggregate growth, but the effect disappears once differences in the 
level of productivity among countries are controlled for.  Moreover, it is not clear which 
circumstances and interactions may be instrumental for such effects.
11 Likewise, Koeniger 
(2005) reports a weak positive relationship between EPL strictness and R&D intensity in OECD 
countries. 
On the other hand, there is considerable evidence suggesting negative efficiency effects of 
mandatory severance pay. There are a number of studies which show that strict employment 
protection including hiring and firing rules as well as severance pay reduces employment. 
Among the early studies, Lazear (1990) finds that severance pay increases unemployment and 
reduces both employment and labor force participation (in their “update” of his findings, 
Addison and Teixeira (2003) confirm the first finding, but cast some doubt on the others). Fallon 
and Lucas (1991) show that strengthening job security regulations led to a strong decline of 
employment in India and Zimbabwe.  
More recent studies confirming the link between job security and lower employment levels 
include Haffner et al (2001), for OECD countries, Heckman and Pages (2000), for OECD and 
Latin American countries, Haltiwanger, Scarpetta and Vodopivec (2003) for OECD and 
transition countries, Besley and Burgess (2004) and Ahsan and Pages (2009) for India and 
Saavedra and Torero (2004) for Chile. Heckman and Pages (2000) attribute a reduction in 
employment of 5 percentage points to job security provisions in Latin America. Montenegro and 
Pagés (2004) report that job security regulations in Chile reduced employment opportunities of 
the young and the unskilled while promoting the employment rates of skilled and older workers. 
OECD (1999) finds insignificant effects on overall employment rates, but points out that 
negative effects are concentrated among prime age women, the youth, and older workers. To the 
extent severance pay increases youth unemployment, this has additional negative consequences 
in terms of the persistence of unemployment and reduced future earnings capacity. Kugler and 
Pica (2008) and Boeri and Jimeno (2005), on the contrary, ascertain small or no effect of an 
increase in dismissal cost for Italian firms with fewer than 15 employees on overall employment 
                                                 
11 A stream of literature on the effects of worker-management, cooperation, and participatory approaches in 
management finds mildly positive effects of these features on productivity of firms, but cannot pinpoint the exact 
ingredients and their interactions which contribute to the success.  Tyson and Levine (1990) do single out measures 
to enhance substantive participation as instrumental for higher productivity – but it is unclear to what extent 
employment protection boosts such measures. 
39or employment growth, whereas Schivardi and Torrini (2008) find only modest effects of stricter 
employment protection on firm growth near the threshold of 15 workers. Studies also show that 
severance pay contributes to part-time employment and self-employment. Moreover, De Ferranti 
et al. (2000) report that severance pay systems produce large litigation costs (arising from 
disputes over the cause of separation) in Latin America. 
There is also mounting evidence that employment protection reduces inflows to and outflows 
from unemployment. By doing so, it contributes to longer unemployment spells (stagnant 
unemployment pool);  flows through employment may not be affected that strongly (for a recent 
survey, see OECD(1999 and 2004) and for evidence on transition economies, Haltiwanger et al, 
2003; see also Botero et al., 2004; Kugler and Saint-Paul, 2004; and Kugler, 1999, 2004). 
Reduced labor market flows may hinder labor force adjustment and the reallocation of jobs, and 
may thereby slow down aggregate productivity growth (see Davis and Haltiwanger, 1999, for a 
survey of the effects of job reallocation on aggregate productivity growth).   
Moreover, there is also evidence that job protection reduces productivity and overall growth. The 
influential OECD (1999) study assessed the extent of job protection against individual dismissal 
for a regular employee who is given notice on personal ground or due to economic redundancy. 
The study considers the strictness of employment protection based on three criteria: procedural 
inconveniences the employer faces when trying to dismiss employees; notice and severance pay 
provisions; and prevailing standards and penalties for “unfair” dismissals. Based on a synthetic 
index of these three elements of employment protection components, recent empirical results 
indicate that higher firing costs adversely affect workers’ productivity and economic growth 
(Scarpetta et al. 2002). Exploiting firm-level micro data Autor et al. (2007) show that the 
adoption of stricter job security provisions in the United States had a positive effect on capital 
investment and a negative effect on total factor productivity. Similar findings are provided by 
Cingano et al. (2010) using Italian data to examine a 1990 reform that raised dismissal costs for 
Italian firms with fewer than 15 employees only. Micco and Pages (2006) also find some weak 
evidence of a negative relationship between dismissal costs and labor productivity for 18 OECD 
and non-OECD countries – albeit due to the presence of Nigeria in the sample. Scarpetta and 
Tressel (2004) show that strict employment protection has a significant negative impact on 
productivity, but only in countries with an intermediate degree of centralization/coordination in 
wage bargaining. OECD (2007) and the revised analysis in Bassanini et al. (2009) based on 
difference-in-differences approach for 16 OECD countries suggests that mandatory dismissal 
regulations have a negative impact on productivity growth in industries where dismissal 
restrictions are more likely to be binding.  
There is strong and rising evidence that employment protection legislation and processes have 
negative effects on worker separation and accession, and therefore on turnover, with 
consequences for sector composition and economic growth. Among recent studies based on 
micro data, Autor et al. (2007) show that the adoption of wrongful-discharge protections by state 
courts in the United States had a negative effect on job flows and firm entry. Similarly, Boeri and 
Jimeno (2005) and Kugler and Pica (2008) confirm negative effects of an increase in dismissal 
costs on job turnover in Italian firms. Kugler (1999, 2004) and Kugler et al. (2003) find that 
reduction in dismissal costs increased accessions as well as separations of workers in Colombia 
and Spain, respectively. Kahn (2007) reports that EPL reduces the separation rates of those 
already employed (mostly prime age adults), at the expense of new entrants and the more highly 
mobile, i.e. young and less skilled. On the contrary, no evidence that dismissal protection 
40affected worker flows were found by microeconometric studies for Germany (Bauer et al., 2007), 
Portugal (Martins, 2009) and Sweden (von Below and Thoursie, 2010). The negative impact of 
employment protection on turnover was confirmed also by cross-country studies performed on 
aggregate data (see Gomez-Salvador et al., 2004; Messina and Vallanti, 2007; Boeri and 
Garibaldi, 2009). To similar conclusions arrive also studies exploiting difference-in-differences 
approach on OECD countries (see Micco and Pages, 2006; Haltiwanger et al., 2010; Bassanini et 
al., 2010; Cingano et al., 2010; and OECD, 2010), by which the negative relationship between 
dismissal costs and job flows is greater in industries with greater propensity to reallocate labor.  
The effects of employment protection legislation described above, however, need to be separated 
from the effects of severance pay, at least for the richer countries where these studies have been 
mostly performed.  In a critical review of the empirical literature Parsons (2011b) comes to the 
conclusion that “severance pay, unaccompanied by other labor regulations have little impact on 
workers separation (and accession) or average employment level.”  Furthermore, he adds that the 
impact of EPL reforms may depend on the regulatory environment in the economy as a whole, 
and there may be important interactions between severance pay mandates and collective 
bargaining rules.  
The evidence from the U.S. emphasizes both the role of trade unions in expanding the coverage 
of severance pay and the use of severance pay as a human resource management tool. In his 
thorough review of severance pay programs for the period 1930-99, Parsons (2005a,b) reports 
that severance pay among clerical and sales workers is only modestly less extensive than the 
coverage of managers and professionals.  But he argues that the evolution of formal coverage of 
blue collar workers is intimately related to the development of the organized labor movement – 
that is, controlling for worker occupation, union status significantly increases the likelihood of 
severance pay coverage (Parsons 2005a). This means that the prevalence of severance pay for 
managers and professionals is likely driven also by the efficiency wage considerations.   
Interestingly, Parsons (2005a,b) also reports that in the U.S., large firms are more likely to have 
formal severance pay plans than small firms. 
The above summary of the findings suggests that economists have indeed shown that 
employment protection legislation matters for labor market outcomes.  Nevertheless severance 
pay systems alone seemingly have no significant impact, at least in upper middle to high income 
countries where most of these studies have been undertaken. Yet, it has not yet been investigated 
to what extent mandated severance pay could become the binding constraint once other 
employment protection legislation has become less restrictive. For low and lower middle income 
countries where unemployment benefits are still the exception but severance pay the rule, the 
impact on labor market outcomes and the effectiveness as unemployment support program still 
awaits comprehensive investigation and future research. 
  
415. Conclusions 
Severance pay programs for formal sector works exist in most countries around the world, often 
providing the only formal income support to the worker made redundant – yet little is known 
about the working of these programs, particularly in developing countries. In order to help filling 
that gap, the present study described the origin of these programs; summarized the salient 
features of severance pay programs throughout the world; formulated and examined hypotheses 
about the economic rationale for the existence of these programs; and reviewed recent reforms of 
these systems. 
The study showed that the origin of mandated severance pay can be traced to three main events: 
the creation of labor codes; the first events of large scale industrial restructuring starting at the 
end of the 19
th century and pressures of the interwar high unemployment episode; and the 
expansion of the welfare state after WWII.  Despite these common origins, the review of existing 
severance pay programs showed that countries use widely differentiated designs, or at least 
parameter values.  
The inventory of mandated severance pay programs and related social policy and country 
indicators in 183 countries offers a rich information base to better understand the program and 
allow for first hypothesis testing.  E.g. the data supports the hypothesis of the wide spread nature 
of severance pay across the world:  Of the 183 countries, all except 13 (i.e. 7 percent) provide 
mandated or quasi-mandated severance pay; the latter are largely concentrated on high income 
and inexistent in low income countries.  While high-income/OECD countries tend to use less 
generous programs and are less likely to mandate such systems, many low and middle-income 
countries offer the most generous systems, and rely on compulsion. In most countries, employers 
account for severance payments as a current operating expense, and few institutional 
arrangements exist for assuring that firms are able to meet their severance pay obligations to 
separating workers. 
The paper also examined the economic rationale for severance pay and found partial support for 
all three hypotheses it advanced: that severance pay serves as a social benefit payment, a human 
resource management tool, and a job protection mechanism.  
Evaluations of both income protection and efficiency properties of severance pay programs, 
usually done for developed countries and mostly as part of a broader assessment of employment 
protection legislation, are typically fairly negative. The direct estimation of severance pay effects 
for developed economies, however, indicates few and limited effects once separated from other 
restrictive employment protection measures. If confirmed by other studies that are able to isolate 
the pure severance effects on employment outcomes, this may call to think about a better 
integration of severance pay with other social benefits, in particular of unemployment and 
retirement, where they exist. If further studies were to show the absence of efficiency effects of 
mandated compared to voluntary severance pay arrangements as human resource instrument, this 
may call for rethinking the mandate. 
An interesting finding of the paper – which should be considered seriously by policymakers in 
developing countries – is that severance pay (and job protection in general) of developed 
countries poses less restrictions on employers as the one of developing and transition countries: it 
offers less generous payments, it is more simple to administer (and hence it generates less costs), 
and it is often not mandated but determined by collective bargaining or firm level decisions. This 
is another indication that in a globalized world, improving labor market outcomes and increasing 
42productivity by the creation of a more flexible labor market – among others by liberalizing 
overly restrictive employment protection legislation – is inescapable. 
The absence of unemployment benefits in low and middle countries often leads to high 
employment protection through mandated severance pay as well as dismissal rules.  The 
challenge will be to move toward less restrictive employment protection legislation while 
providing effective and incentive oriented income support schemes in a job-enabling 
environment– i.e. the quest for a low and middle income country’ version of “flexicurity”.   
Moving along these lines would suggest to reduce the notional generosity while improving 
compliance and hence the effective generosity.  And low and middle income countries should 
explore the introduction of Individual Savings Accounts that provide a risk management 
instrument against a broad range of risks, and the reforms needed to create the enabling 
environment for such accounts. 
Despite recent promising reforms by several countries, finding the best avenues for reforming 
severance pay remains a task for future research. Critical contributions for such a research are 
suggested in three areas. First, it would be useful to disentangle better the individual and joint 
effects of the Employment Protection Legislation (EPL), with severance pay being one of its 
components.  If severance pay programs were to have non-positive effects on labor market 
outcomes one could think about replacing the mandate by contractual arrangements or by folding 
them into other social benefits.  Second, another fruitful area is investigating the efficiency 
effects of voluntary severance pay programs for itself and also compared to other and more 
modern remuneration schemes that attempt to improve and capture knowledge by workers.  The 
result would provide decision information on de-mandating the severance pay.  Last but not 
least, it will be important to explore the liquidity preferences of workers as they seem to explain 
much of the support for the continuation of existing severance pay programs and the rejection of 
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50ANNEX 1: Historic Perspectives across Countries and Regions 
For these historic perspectives we combine regional and historical information on severance pay, 
focusing first on the developments in the United States, UK, and Japan. We then extrapolate 
some ideas about how severance pay evolved in developing and transition countries, relying on 
the sparse evidence available on this topic.   
Severance Pay History in the United States 
In the US, one of the earliest examples was in 1922 when the Delaware and Hudson Railroad 
adopted dismissal compensation as part of its benefit program. A large oil company paid 
dismissal compensation in 1925 when it was implementing a merger. The first big dismissal plan 
was in the Chicago clothing industry. The Amalgamated Clothing Workers and Hart, Schaffner 
and Marx had built a comprehensive industrial relations program. About 236 dismissed workers 
received $500 each in 1926. Severance payments ranging from $150 - $500 had been paid on 
several occasions earlier in the industry. The amounts of compensation were determined more by 
the financial condition of the firm rather than the needs of the workers due to the prevailing 
market conditions. The contribution was made by the firm and the remaining workers who 
temporarily gave up unemployment insurance rights. There were plenty of such incidents in the 
clothing industry where workers were dismissed due to increased mechanization of the industry. 
Until 1929, most of the dismissal plans aimed to assist those displaced by mergers, 
consolidations of offices and plants, or changes in working rules. 
Similarly, dismissal plans including severance pay also emerged in several large scale industries 
such as rubber manufacturing (1929), oil refining (1931 and 1936), banking (1934), public 
utility(1938), food manufacturing (1938), and auto manufacturing (1940) (Hawkins 1940). In 
these cases, severance pay plans depended on experience and age of workers, but usually to all 
employees. 
In San Francisco, the building of the Golden Gate and Bay bridges implied displacement of the 
large workforce employed on ferry boats. A union arbitrator recalled this experience in 1936 
(Box 2.3).  
The practice of paying compensation to dismissed employees was followed in the US by many 
Box A.1 Golden Gate and Bay bridges – Job displacement and Severance Pay 
"Before the bridges, everybody went by ferryboat, and the old railroad commission gave the 
ferryboat companies a higher return, because they'd be out of business when the bridges 
opened. But the workers -- what about them? There were about 4,000 of them …they wanted 
severance pay, but in 1932 nobody had ever heard of severance pay. The average length of 
service was 15 years, and we wanted one month's pay for every year of service. To make a 
long story short, we went to the president of the Southern Pacific railroad, which ran most of 
the ferries, and told him we wanted severance pay. ... ‘Or what?’ he said. ‘Or we'll go on 
strike,’ I said. Well, there was no way to get across the bay except by ferryboat. So he said, ‘I 
have some figures here for one offer only,’ and he turned them over, like cards. He said, ‘I'll 
give you one month's pay for every year of service, and that's it.’ Well,.., that was exactly what 
we were demanding! But we didn't take it right away. We said, ‘We'll caucus.’ We took it.”  
Excerpt from interview with Sam Kagel, arbitrator.  The San Francisco Chronicle “Ah, the 
'30s, Full of Struggle And the Joy of Life” Carl Nolte, Sunday, May 2, 1999 
51firms even before any unemployment insurance laws were passed. However, legislation on 
mandatory severance pay was never enacted in the US – not even on the state level – one of the 
few industrialized countries not to have done so.  Instead, it left the issue to the firms and 
collective agreements to establish and implement.  The firms adopted severance payments plans 
to reward faithful employees, but also as a public relations exercise and to sustain plant morale.   
Parsons (2005a) noted that during the 1930s, employers adopted different types of advanced 
notice plans.  Flat rate plans largely helped get rid of inefficient labor and served as a mechanism 
for protection plant morale by quickly dispersing disgruntled workers. Graduated plans seemed 
to specifically reward workers for their long service to the company. Many companies also had 
informal or ad hoc plans they applied based on the particular situation of workers. Thus, 
companies seemed to target different severance plans to different types of workers.  
In the 1940s and 50s, severance plans did not expand nearly as much as in the previous decade. 
Unions became more involved in promoting these plans as part of collective agreements. But 
severance pay coverage grew much slower than pensions, health or insurance coverage. 
Severance pay was used when workers were unjustly dismissed, retrenched through 
consolidation or because of technological change. From the 1970s onward, severance pay 
coverage decreased. Some industries appeared to drop severance pay plans between 1960s and 
1970s. In subsequent decades, severance pay coverage actually decreased despite higher job 
insecurity. Parsons (2005b) suggests that severance pay was not responsive to demand as its use 
did not necessarily increase during downturns. In fact, severance pay primarily reflected the 
employer’s desire to limit the morale impact of dismissals.  
Severance pay in the United Kingdom 
In the UK during the 1920s, some of the dismissal plans developed as supplements to 
unemployment insurance. In 1928, Cadbury Brothers Ltd. had to lay off about 500 workers. The 
chocolate industry had undergone considerable mechanization leading to more efficient 
processes. The firm in addition to unemployment benefits had a regular plan for dismissal 
compensation. Special provisions were made for lump sum payments to those moving out of the 
district, emigrating, or going into business. In England, because of the national insurance law the 
tendency was toward paying periodic payments of equal sums that did not vary with service or 
salary of the employee. Trade Unionism was strong in Britain and had secured a number of 
agreements limiting the employer’s absolute right to dismiss. 
In subsequent decades, redundancy payments became institutionalized through the Redundancy 
Payment Act of 1965. This legislation essentially helped the state subsidize industrial 
restructuring. Redundancy payments were meant to encourage employees to leave employment 
in declining industries and move to growing sectors.  Severance pay also became increasingly 
useful to address unjust dismissals, which often sparked collective action or strikes. In both UK 
and New Zealand, severance pay could help decentralize and individualize dismissals, and 
thereby avoid strikes and better manage labor disputes.  
Severance Pay in Japan 
Already before the Japanese “leaving” allowance act was passed in 1936, and before the 
“fortnight dismissal wage” law of 1926 was enacted, many voluntary schemes of dismissal 
compensation were adopted by larger enterprises as standard procedure or to meet particular 
emergencies requiring reductions in work force. Compensation was also paid to those laid off 
because of sickness, accident or old age, and occasionally to those who quit voluntarily and those 
52who are discharged for strike activity. Compensation in the case of non-fault dismissals was 
more generous which can be attributed to paternalism. The transition of the Japanese feudal 
economy to an industrial one was so quick that the human feelings of the employer and the sense 
of justice of the employee heavily influenced dismissal policies.  
In June 1935, the Japanese Bureau of Social Affairs conducted a study of all industrial and 
mining concerns employing 50 or more workers and found that 1,582 firms had written 
regulations governing leaving allowances. Workers and employers also addressed provisioning 
for severance pay as early as 1936. In many firms, workers and employers adopted internal 
regulations for provisioning through contributions by both workers and employers. (Hawkins, 
1942) Dismissal plans in Japan were in that period were found to be relatively generous 
compared to plans in the US. 
In summary, developments till WWII suggest that the rising importance of severance payments 
has been linked many factors.  These range from industrial re-structuring, top-ups to flat 
unemployment benefits and focused originally on a few sectors and white-color workers only.  
There were also legal arrangements ranging from mandated in labor code or special laws, to 
general or selective collective bargain arrangements to voluntary schemes. 
Historic origins of severance pay in developing and transition countries 
As illustrated in the case of France, the US and UK, the third main element for making severance 
payments almost ubiquitous in the world is the conscious expansion of social programs after 
WWII. There was also a distinct trend in the translation or copying of labor market programs 
from the industrialized North in the de-colonizing South. The development of a “Social Welfare 
State” in the North led to the gradual expansion of existing programs to ever larger parts of the 
population, and to the introduction or expansion of related programs, in particular unemployment 
benefits and old-age pensions. But while severance payments remain typically linked to the labor 
code and related legislation or collective bargaining arrangements – and hence stem from an 
employee/employer relationship – the other related social programs are typically established by 
special social laws and are determined by public action. 
In developing countries, the introduction or expansion of severance-type payments has received 
little attention and only limited references do exist. It has been suggested that the provision of 
severance pay in a number of developing countries was deemed a somewhat transient legislative 
measure, the need for which would decline with the development of fuller employment policy 
and an extensive social security system. 
For example, the provision of severance pay was “subject to this obligation coming to an end on 
the promulgation of legislation concerning social insurance (Costa Rica) or to the replacement of 
compensation by benefits from a welfare fund (Dominican Republic, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria); see 
Herz (1954: 319). 
In Latin America, the origins and development of severance pay can be assessed by tracing when 
related legislations were introduced, and how labor movements may have shaped severance pay 
subsequently. Indeed, legislations on severance pay appeared to concur with the introduction of 
labor codes in multiple Latin American countries. The first mention of severance pay legislation 
occurred in Mexico (1917), and later Bolivia (1924 and 1925), Chile (1924), Argentina (1930), 
Colombia (1934), El Salvador (1935), Peru (1924, 1925, 1930), Venezuela (19360 and Uruguay 
53(1944). In most countries, severance pay applied to salaried workers, commercial employees or 
wage earners.  
When considering the rationale for introducing severance pay, Mexico’s practice of severance 
allowances has been interpreted as an “expression of accumulation of property like equity in 
employment with entitles worker to a form of liquidated damages upon the destruction of his 
job.” (see Box 2.4). 
 
In Argentina, the introduction of severance pay followed the consolidation of the early labor 
movement in 1930 under General Confederation of Labor (CGT). By 1932, CGT had delivered a 
series of legislative demands on shorter working hours, severance pay, and other welfare 
measures. These demands would form part of ongoing political debate, and though many would 
be adopted over the coming years, they lacked enforcement. During the subsequent Peronist era, 
the creation of labor secretariat helped formalize the relationship between unions and the state 
and effectively implement such workers benefits and protections.  
Several countries also took active measures to ensure funding for severance pay. Chile addressed 
the funding issue by requiring employers to deposit 8.33% of each employee’s salary (up to 
3,500 pesos) with the national savings bank. Employee could collect this amount, plus the 
interest earned on it, upon termination of employment (Hawkins, 1942). In 1928, Ecuador 
adopted legislation for provisioning as well though employers were only required to set aside the 
appropriate salary, not necessarily deposit it in a separate account.   
Box A.2Severance pay in Mexico: Compensation for liquidated damages of job ownership 
Mexico stands out for having early legislation that justified a form of severance pay. As its 1917 
Constitution reflects the significant symbolic role of the working class and peasants, specific articles 
introduced the concept that workers had a right to their jobs. Employers were required to prove that 
they had just cause for firing a worker. Otherwise, workers were entitled to 3 months wages as 
indemnity, or could choose reinstatement in their previous job. Should employers refuse reinstatement, 
then workers received severance pay graduated by years of service in addition to 3 months indemnity 
pay.  
As labor laws evolved to increase protection for workers, employers attempted to limit the class of 
workers to which these laws applied. Simultaneously, legislation leaned towards reinstatement rather 
than severance pay in recognition of specific labor market characteristics. Dismissal implied not only 
a loss of precious seniority, but also starting at the bottom of the job and wage ladder. Severance pay 
was considered inadequate compensation for such damages. A further rational for reinstatement was 
the lack of insurance against the risks of job loss.  In reality, reinstatement was an unattractive option 
to workers and employers as both considered their relationship “a broken marriage”. Workers feared 
retribution by their employers, who would make working conditions sufficiently unpleasant so as to 
induce them to quit. While workers could have accessed a greater settlement by demanding 
reinstatement, many settled out of court and for less than the statutory severance pay. Union 
representatives could pressure workers to settle and sanction workers by preventing their further 
employment in a given industry. Moreover, even when employers had legal justification for large scale 
dismissal, the burden of proof and onerous legal proceedings made collective bargaining and 
severance pay the preferred option. Needless to say, severance pay was a luxury afforded only to 
workers in the formal sector, and the large informal sector had none of such protection. 
Based on Meyers (1965): Ownerships of Jobs 
54In many Latin American countries, Herz (1954) noted the strong role of legislation protecting 
workers and the heavy involvement of courts in dismissal cases (speculating this was the case 
because of the then weak collective bargaining). For example, in Mexico and Guatemala, 
employers had to justify dismissals through formal procedures, and employees usually received 
dismissal compensation unless they were guilty of misconduct. Since then, job protection 
appears to remain the motivation behind severance pay, or specifically to punish unjust 
dismissals. Moreover, labor legislations have been layered on top of each other, reflecting the 
notion that workers have acquired rights and that their benefits should not be curtailed. The 
historically strong relationship between leftist political parties and unions seems to also explain 
the promulgation of labor protecting legislation.  
In African countries, the introduction of severance pay appears to have been influenced by late 
colonial relationships. Visisombat (1968) provides interesting reading regarding employment law 
developments in post-WWII French-speaking Africa. Visisombat reports that prior to 1952 
employment law across French overseas territories varied. Employment law in the French 
overseas territories was standardized with the passing of the 1952 Labor Code for Overseas 
Territories which brought together “rules scattered through various decrees and orders issued by 
governors” in Africa. The 1952 Code marked “an important, perhaps even historic, stage in the 
development of African social legislation” ... “due to the fact that it applied equally to all 
workers without discrimination on grounds of sex, nationality, legal status or origin and in all 
African countries for which the Ministry for Overseas France was responsible” ... “but not the 
North African protectorates (Morocco and Tunisia) or the Algerian departments” (Visisombat, 
1968:122). The 1952 Code referred to “separation grants”, but only as far as there [¨was] 
provision for them under the contract of employment or collective agreement”. In other words, 
severance pay was not provided under the 1952 Code on a statutory compulsory basis. 
Following independence, a large number of newly independent governments adopted new 
national labor codes throughout the course of the 1960s. Although country differences have 
emerged, to a large extent, the 1952 Code has been influential in shaping the development of 
these new African national codes in the former overseas French territories. Importantly, in the 
post-colonial era many of the new national labor codes made improvements to better protect the 
rights of employees threatened with the loss of employment. However, in the immediate post-
colonial era, few countries moved toward introducing statutory severance pay. In the late 1960s, 
the labor codes of Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, and Tunisia were the only examples “giving a legal and 
compulsory form to this type of grant” [severance pay] (Visisombat, 1968: 138). 
One might also note that French severance pay legislation itself evolved only slowly between 
1890 and 1950, largely following regional and national plant agreements and bargaining. These 
laws essentially solidified judge made laws and lower court decisions. Therefore, it may be 
unlikely that these practices would have been significant in the 1952 code that was transferred to 
Francophone African countries (as indeed, there was no mention of severance pay therein). It is 
also worth mentioning that some African countries had severance pay legislation in place before 
independence. For example, the first mention of severance pay legislation occurred in 1952 in 
Madagascar. This legislation referred to compensation in case of work stoppages (specifically 
related to employees in the sugar industry).  
In Asia, severance pay dates back to the 1950s in countries such as Sri Lanka and India, while it 
is more recent in countries such as Thailand and Malaysia. Asher (2003) notes that particularly in 
India, each amendment to labor legislation has provided greater protection to the worker. Some 
55of the practice of severance pay appeared related to retrenchment occurring during the energy 
crisis (1973, 1979) but also reflected that a shortage of raw materials could stop work and lead to 
retrenchment. In Sri Lanka and India, severance pay would appear to have been a useful measure 
during economic restructuring. However, the more expensive Voluntary Retirement Schemes 
were far more common for curtailing the workforce during restructuring.  Perhaps the benefits 
paid under severance pay were insufficient to cut back enough labor.  
Particularly in Sri Lanka, the use of voluntary retirement schemes also reflected the highly 
politicized nature of labor movements. From its inception in the 1930s, the trade union 
movement was aligned along political parties, rather than occupational categories. From a 
historical perspective, workers were perceived as the victims of exploitation and needed State 
support. Moreover, employment security was still considered as an instrument for guaranteeing 
income security. Thus, job protection (often tied to political patronage) looms large in Sri 
Lankan labor movements. Altogether, these factors help explain why workers supported trade 
union representatives during the economic restructuring of the early 1990s. Their representatives 
could always bargain them a better deal, leading to increasingly larger redundancy compensation 
packages (Kelegama and Salih, 1998).   
There is little information about the origins of severance pay legislations in the Middle East. 
Herz (1954) documented early legislation that determined advanced notice period. As noted 
earlier, in Lebanon severance pay was meant to be temporary legislation to be replaced by a 
welfare fund. However, severance pay is still prevalent in Lebanon today. Severance pay 
appeared to evolve as part of large social protection systems in this region, reflecting the state’s 
roles both in regulating the labor market and as an employer. Stronger union activity in the early 
1990s is also appeared to strengthen severance pay (Robalino and Mataoanu, 2005).  While 
nowadays essential all countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa have severance pay and 
pension provisions for their formal labor force, very few have to day unemployment benefits 
(Angel-Urdinola and  Kuddo, 2010).  A special feature of severance pay concerns the many 
migrants to the 7 countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).  For them, severance pay is 
(besides basic health care) the only social protection benefit and is legislated by the labor code 
(see Holzmann and Pouget, 2010). 
Among former Soviet countries, only Estonia has evidence of early severance pay legislation 
(1934 and 1936). Severance pay, or any dismissals for that matter, were essentially meaningless 
during the Soviet times and did not exist. Employees could only be dismissed for extremely 
limited reasons, each of which required different and complex dismissal procedures. With the 
transition to the market system, all countries adopted new severance pay legislations and 
unemployment benefits.  While the latter continue covering often very few unemployed workers, 
severance pay is much more comprehensive and at times notionally generous but also innovative.   
In a number of countries (including the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia), 
severance pay is not paid in case the worker continues with a new employer ( Kuddo, 2009). 










































n Rate      
(% of salary)
Afghanistan 1 0 .. .. R, .. .. 0.0 8.7 17.3 26.0 26.0 4.9
Albania 1 .. .. .. D, R 36 0.0 0.0 10.7 21.4 42.9 1.4
Algeria 0 1 a .. D, R 36 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 5.6
Angola 1 .. .. .. R, .. .. 0.0 2.2 10.8 21.7 54.2 2.2
Antigua and Barbuda 1 .. .. .. R, .. .. 0.0 2.4 12.0 24.0 48.0 2.4
Argentina 1 1 p
Agricultural workers 
and domestic workers
R .. 4.3 4.3 21.7 43.3 86.7 4.3
Armenia 1 0 a None D, I .. 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 1.9
Australia 1 1 p Firm size less 15  R 12 0.0 4.0 10.0 12.0 0.0 2.4
Austria 1 1 p
Agricultural workers 
and domestic workers
E .. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0  1.54 
Azerbaijan 1 .. a Army, Judiciary D, R .. 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 5.6
Bahamas 1 .. .. .. R, .. .. 1.5 2.0 10.0 20.0 24.0 2.0
Bahrain 1 0 p expats (own system) E 12 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0 12 1.0
Bangladesh 1 .. p
Firms size less 5, 
managerial positions
R, I 12 0.0 5.0 25.0 50.0 100.0 5.0
Belarus 1 1 a None D, R, B .. 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 5.6
Belgium 0 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0
Belize 1 0 .. .. R, .. .. 0.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 20.0 0.7
Benin 1 0 .. .. D, R .. 0.0 1.3 6.5 14.1 31.4 1.3
Bhutan 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0
Bolivia 1 .. p Agricultural workers D, R 3 .. .. .. .. .. ..
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 .. .. .. D, R 24 0.0 0.0 7.2 14.4 28.9 1.0
Botswana 1 .. .. .. D, R 60 1.8 2.4 12.0 36.0 84.0 2.8
Brazil 1 0 p
Agricultural and 
domestic workers
D, R, B, I, O - E 1.2 1.7 8.3 16.6 33.3 1.7 ..  8.00 
Brunei Darussalam 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Bulgaria 1 1 p Firm size less 20 R,O,I .. 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 1.9
Burkina Faso 1 0 p none D,R 12 0.0 1.1 5.4 11.9 29.3 1.1
Burundi 1 0 .. .. R, .. .. 0.0 0.0 8.7 13.0 13.0 1.0
Cambodia 1 0 .. .. R, .. .. 1.0 2.1 10.7 21.4 26.0 2.1
Cameroon 1 .. p none D, R 24 0.0 1.5 7.6 15.2 30.3 1.5




R 12 0.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 20.0 0.7
Cape Verde 1 .. .. .. R, .. .. 3.3 4.3 21.7 43.3 86.7 4.3
Central African Republic 1 0 .. .. R, .. .. 17.3 17.3 17.3 17.3 17.3 7.5
Chad 1 0 .. .. R, .. .. 0.0 0.0 5.4 11.9 27.1 0.8







































n Rate      
(% of salary)
End-of-Service Pay Legal Base Coverage Defined Benefits for Redundancy Defined Contribution
Chile 1 1 p
Domestic workers and 
managerial positions
D,R 12 0.0 4.3 21.7 10.0 47.7 3.2
China 1 .. p none D,R .. 4.3 4.3 21.7 43.3 86.7 4.3
Colombia 1 0 p none D,R .. 4.3 4.3 15.7 30.0 58.6 3.5
Comoros 1 0 .. .. R, .. .. 4.3 4.3 21.7 43.3 86.7 4.3
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Congo, Rep. 1 0 .. .. R, .. .. 0.0 0.0 6.1 13.4 29.9 0.9
Costa Rica 1 .. p none D,R .. 2.0 2.8 15.2 25.1 25.1 2.8
Cote d'Ivoire 1 1 p none D,R 12 0.0 1.3 6.5 14.1 31.4 1.3
Croatia 1 .. p none D,R 24 0.0 0.0 7.2 14.4 26.0 1.0
Cyprus 0 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Czech Republic 1 1 p Firm size less 20 R,I .. 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 5.6
Denmark 1 1 p
Firm size less 20, 
domestic workers, 
seafarers, blue collar 
workers 
D,R,E 144 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Djibouti 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Dominica 1 .. .. .. R,  .. .. 0.0 0.0 9.0 19.0 49.0 1.2




D,R,O 3 2.4 3.8 20.9 41.8 83.6 4.1
Ecuador 1 .. a none D,R .. 13.0 14.1 27.1 54.2 108.3 8.3
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1 .. p Domestic wokers R .. 4.3 4.3 21.7 54.2 119.2 4.7
El Salvador 1 .. .. .. R, .. .. 3.2 4.3 21.4 42.9 85.7 4.3
Equatorial Guinea 1 .. .. .. R, .. .. 4.8 6.4 32.1 64.3 128.6 6.4
Eritrea 1 .. R, .. .. 1.5 2.0 10.0 25.0 65.0 2.2
Estonia 1 .. .. .. D,R,B .. 8.7 4.3 4.3 4.3 17.3 1.9
Ethiopia 1 .. p Managerial positions  D,R,B .. 3.2 4.3 10.0 17.1 31.4 2.7
Fiji 1 .. .. .. R, .. 12 0.0 1.0 5.0 10.0 20.0 1.0
Finland 0 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0
France 1 1 p none D,R,E 12 0.0 0.9 4.3 8.7 23.1 0.9
Gabon 1 0 .. .. R, .. .. 0.0 0.0 4.3 8.7 17.3 0.6







































n Rate      
(% of salary)
End-of-Service Pay Legal Base Coverage Defined Benefits for Redundancy Defined Contribution
Georgia 1 .. a none D,R .. 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 1.9
Germany 1 1 p
Firm size less 10, 
managerial positions
R,E 6 0.0 2.2 10.8 21.7 43.3 2.2
Ghana 1 1 a Army, state security R .. 6.5 8.7 43.3 86.7 173.3 8.7
Greece 1 .. a none D,R,I 2 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0 24.0 10.4
Grenada 1 .. .. .. D, R .. 0.0 1.0 5.0 10.0 20.0 1.0
Guatemala 1 .. .. .. D, R .. 3.8 5.1 25.3 50.6 101.1 5.1
Guinea 1 .. .. .. R, .. 12 0.0 1.1 5.4 10.8 21.7 1.1
Guinea-Bissau 1 .. .. .. R, .. .. 13.0 13.0 21.7 43.3 86.7 7.2
Guyana 1 .. .. .. R, .. 12 0.0 2.0 10.0 25.0 52.0 2.2
Haiti 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Honduras 1 .. .. .. D,R .. 3.3 4.3 21.7 43.3 86.7 4.3
Hong Kong 1 .. .. .. D,R 24 0.0 0.3 1.4 2.9 5.8 0.3
Hungary 1 .. p Firm size less 20 D,R,B,E 36 0.0 0.0 8.7 13.0 21.7 1.0
Iceland 0 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. ..  .. 
India 1 .. a Firm size less 50  R,I 12 2.1 2.1 10.7 21.4 42.9 2.1
Indonesia 1 1 p Domestic workers D,R,B, I, E .. 4.3 13.0 34.7 56.3 108.3 8.5
Iran 1 .. a none D,R,E,O,I .. 0.0 4.3 21.7 43.3 86.7 4.3
Iraq 0 .. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Ireland 1 1 .. none R 24 0.2 0.7 2.6 5.0 9.8 0.6
Israel 1 1 ..
Workers excluded If 
employer contirbutes 
to pension plan
D,I,E 12 0.0 4.3 21.7 43.3 86.7 4.3
Italy 1 1 p none E n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0 ..  7.00 
Jamaica 1 0 p none D,R 24 0.0 0.0 10.0 20.0 50.0 1.3
Japan 0 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0
Jordan 1 .. p
Agricultural workers 
and domestic workers
D,R,E .. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Kazakhstan 1 .. .. none D,R,B,E .. 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 1.9
Kenya 1 .. a Army, police R .. 1.6 2.1 10.7 21.4 42.9 2.1
Kiribati 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Korea 1 0 p None D,R, E 12 0.0 4.3 21.7 43.3 86.7 4.3
Kosovo 1 .. .. .. R, .. .. 0.0 0.0 8.7 13.0 17.3 1.0
Kuwait 1 0 p expats (own system) D, R - E 12 1.6 2.1 10.7 32.5 75.8 2.5 12 0.7
Kyrgyz Republic 1 .. a
Firm size less 15,  
managerial positions 
R .. 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 5.6







































n Rate      
(% of salary)
End-of-Service Pay Legal Base Coverage Defined Benefits for Redundancy Defined Contribution
Latvia 1 .. .. .. D,R,B,I,E .. 4.3 4.3 8.7 13.0 17.3 2.5
Lebanon 0 .. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0
Lesotho 1 .. .. .. R, .. 12 0.0 2.0 10.0 20.0 40.0 2.0
Liberia 1 .. .. .. R, .. .. 3.0 4.0 20.0 40.0 80.0 4.0
Lithuania 1 .. .. .. D,R,E .. 4.3 8.7 17.3 21.7 26.0 4.8
Luxembourg 1 .. p none D,R 60 0.0 0.0 4.3 8.7 26.0 0.6
Macedonia 1 .. .. .. D,R .. 4.3 4.3 8.7 13.0 21.7 2.5
Madagascar 1 0 .. none D,R,B 6 0.0 1.7 8.3 16.7 26.0 1.7
Malawi 1 .. a Police, army D,R 12 0.0 2.0 10.0 30.0 80.0 2.3
Malaysia 1 0 a none D,R 12 0.0 1.7 16.7 33.3 66.7 2.8
Maldives 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0
Mali 1 0 .. none D,R 12 4.3 5.2 8.7 14.1 27.1 2.8
Marshall Islands 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0
Mauritania 1 .. .. .. R, .. .. 0.8 1.1 5.4 11.9 27.1 1.1
Mauritius 1 .. .. .. R, .. 12 0.0 0.4 4.3 14.3 42.9 0.9
Mexico 1 .. p none D,R .. 14.1 14.6 21.4 30.0 47.1 7.3
Micronesia 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0
Moldova 1 .. a none D,R,B,I .. 9.6 9.6 13.6 18.6 28.7 4.7
Mongolia 1 .. .. .. D,R .. 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 1.9
Montenegro 1 .. .. .. R, .. .. 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.0 11.3
Morocco 1 1 p
Firm size less 10, 
domestic workers, 
fi
D,R 6 2.2 2.2 10.9 27.3 76.4 2.4
Mozambique 1 .. .. .. D,R .. 13.0 13.0 32.5 65.0 130.0 8.7
Namibia 1 .. .. .. R, .. 12 0.0 1.0 5.0 10.0 20.0 1.0
Nepal 1 .. a Firm size less 10,  R 6 0.0 4.3 21.4 42.9 85.7 4.3
Netherlands 0 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0
New Zealand 0 1 .. .. R 12 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Nicaragua 1 .. a none D,R,E .. 3.3 4.3 18.8 21.7 21.7 3.4
Niger 1 1 p none D,R 12 4.3 5.2 8.7 3.5 30.3 2.4
Nigeria 1 .. a




R .. 1.7 2.3 11.4 22.9 45.8 2.3







































n Rate      
(% of salary)
End-of-Service Pay Legal Base Coverage Defined Benefits for Redundancy Defined Contribution
Oman 1 0 a expats (own system) E 12 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0 12 17.3
Pakistan 1 .. a Firm size less 20  D,R,I .. 3.2 4.3 21.4 42.9 85.7 4.3
Palau 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0
Panama 1 .. p
Members of 
cooperatives
R .. 3.0 4.0 19.0 34.0 44.0 3.7
Papua New Guinea 1 .. .. .. R, .. .. 1.3 1.7 8.7 17.3 34.7 1.7
Paraguay 1 .. .. .. R, .. .. 2.1 2.1 10.7 42.9 85.7 2.9
Peru 1 .. p none R - E .. 0.0 2.9 14.3 17.1 17.1 2.5 ..  8.33 
Philippines 1 .. p none R,I,B 6 4.3 4.3 21.7 43.3 86.7 4.3
Poland 0 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0
Portugal 1 .. a none D,R 12 13.0 13.0 21.7 43.3 86.7 7.2
Puerto Rico 0 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0
Qatar 1 0 .. .. R - E .. 0.0 3.0 15.0 30.0 60.0 3.0 12 1.0
Romania 0 1 .. .. .. .. 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 1.9
Russian Federation 1 .. a
Army, managerial 
positions
D,R,B .. 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.7 3.8
Rwanda 1 .. .. .. R, .. .. 0.0 4.3 8.7 13.0 21.7 2.5
Samoa 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0
Sao Tome and Principe 1 .. .. .. R, .. .. 13.0 13.0 21.7 43.3 86.7 7.2
Saudi Arabia 1 0 a expats (own system) D,R,B,I - E  .. 2.2 2.2 10.8 32.5 75.8 2.5 12 0.9
Senegal 1 1 p Seafarers D,R 12 0.0 5.4 9.8 16.3 33.6 3.0
Serbia 1 .. .. .. R, .. .. 0.0 1.4 7.2 14.4 25.3 1.4
Seychelles 1 .. .. .. R, .. .. 1.3 1.7 8.6 17.1 34.3 1.7
Sierra Leone 1 .. .. .. R, .. .. 4.0 4.4 28.0 72.0 180.0 5.7
Singapore 0 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0
Slovak Republic 1 .. p Seafarers R,I .. 8.7 8.7 13.0 13.0 13.0 4.2
Slovenia 1 .. p
Firm size less 10,  
managerial positions
D,R,I 12 0.0 0.9 5.4 10.8 28.9 1.0
Solomon Islands 1 0 .. .. R, .. .. 1.5 2.0 10.0 20.0 40.0 2.0
South Africa 1 1 a
Army, state security, 
seafarers
R,B 12 0.0 1.0 5.0 10.0 20.0 1.0
Spain 1 .. p none D,R,B,I .. 2.1 2.9 14.3 28.6 52.0 2.9
Sri Lanka 1 0 p
Firm size less 15, 
members of 
cooperatives
D,R,B,I,O,E 60 8.1 10.8 54.2 97.5 169.0 10.5
St. Kitts and Nevis 0 .. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0
St. Lucia 1 .. .. .. R, .. .. 0.0 1.0 7.0 20.0 50.0 1.5
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines







































n Rate      
(% of salary)
End-of-Service Pay Legal Base Coverage Defined Benefits for Redundancy Defined Contribution
Sudan 1 .. .. .. R, .. .. 0.0 0.0 21.7 43.3 113.8 2.9
Suriname 1 .. .. .. R, .. .. 4.0 4.0 5.0 17.3 26.0 2.2
Swaziland 1 .. .. .. R, .. .. 0.0 0.0 8.0 18.0 38.0 1.1
Sweden 0 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 9.0
Switzerland 1 1 p Firm size less 20 D,R,E 240 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Syria 1 .. p Domestic workers D,R,E .. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Taiwan 1 .. .. .. D,R .. 1.6 2.2 10.8 43.3 86.7 2.9
Tajikistan 1 .. .. .. R, .. .. 4.3 4.3 5.4 10.8 21.7 2.2
Tanzania 1 .. a Police, army D,R 12 0.0 1.0 5.0 10.0 10.0 1.0
Thailand 1 1 p
Agricultural workers, 
domestic workers
D,R 4 5.0 15.0 30.0 50.0 50.0 8.7
Timor-Leste 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0
Togo 1 0 .. .. R, .. .. 1.0 1.3 6.5 14.1 31.4 1.3
Tonga 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0
Trinidad and Tobago 1 .. .. .. R, .. .. 2.2 2.2 11.9 28.2 60.7 2.5
Tunisia 1 1 p
Seafarers, domestic 
workers
D,R 36 1.3 1.7 8.6 13.0 13.0 1.6
Turkey 1 1 p





D,R,I,O 12 0.0 4.3 21.7 43.3 86.7 4.3
Uganda 1 .. a Army I,B .. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ukraine 1 .. .. .. D,R,B,I .. 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 1.9
United Arab Emirates 1 0 a expats (own system) D, R - E 12 2.3 3.0 15.0 36.4 79.3 3.2 12 1.4
United Kingdom 1 1 a Police, army, seafarers  R 24 0.0 0.0 2.6 5.1 10.5 0.3
United States 0 1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0
Uruguay 1 .. a none D,R .. 5.2 5.2 26.0 31.2 31.2 4.5
Uzbekistan 1 .. .. .. D,R .. 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.0 5.6
Vanuatu 1 .. .. .. R, .. .. 0.0 4.3 21.7 43.3 43.3 4.3
Venezuela 1 .. p
Firm size less 10, 
domestic workers
D,R,O 3 .. .. .. .. .. ..





D,R, E 12 0.0 4.3 21.7 43.3 86.7 4.3
West Bank and Gaza 1 0 .. .. R, .. .. 4.3 4.3 21.7 43.3 86.7 4.3
Yemen 1 0 p
Agricultural and 
domestic workers,







































n Rate      
(% of salary)
End-of-Service Pay Legal Base Coverage Defined Benefits for Redundancy Defined Contribution
Zambia 1 1 a
Domestic workers, 
police, army, judiciary, 
managerial positions
D,R,I .. 6.5 8.7 43.3 86.7 173.3 8.7





















































































.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. none n.a. 4.3 Asia low income 405 .. 0.00 ..
.. I-C  fully .. no reform n.a. UI 16 PAYGO .. 11.6 Transition upper middle income 3,808 .. .. ..
.. E-F .. ..
Collective 
Framework 




2006 UI 36 PAYGO 80 4.3 MENA upper middle income 4,029 18.40 .. ..
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. Pilot .. 4.3 Africa lower middle income 4,081 .. .. ..
.. I-C .. .. .. .. UA .. PAYGO .. 3.4 LAC upper middle income 12,920
.. I-C partially ..
 Doubling of 
severance pay for 
non-regular 
employees
2000 UI 10 PAYGO 62 7.2 LAC upper middle income 7,626 13.50 36.70 25.4
.. I-C fully .. No reform n.a. UI 13 PAYGO .. 8.7 Transition lower middle income 2,826 28.70 56.20 46.3
Yes I-C partially .. No reform n.a. UA 42 mixed 42 4.0 OECD high income 42,279 5.50 19.10 15.3
No E-A partially yes
Move to individual 
severance savings 
accounts 
2003 dual 61 PAYGO 80 2.0 OECD high income 45,561 4.30 35.10 10.2
.. I-C fully .. No reform n.a. UI 9 PAYGO .. 8.7 Transition upper middle income 4,899 7.50 .. ..
.. I-C .. .. .. .. UI .. PAYGO .. 0.0 LAC high income .. .. .. ..
.. I-C untaxed .. .. .. UI .. PAYGO 79 4.3 MENA high income 26,021 .. 0.00 ..
No I-C .. ..
Decreased 
generosity
1985 none n.a. PAYGO .. 4.3 Asia low income 551 4.00 .. ..
.. I-C fully .. No reform n.a. UI 8 PAYGO .. 8.7 Transition upper middle income 5,075 .. 79.70 ..
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. UI 65 PAYGO 42 6.0 OECD high income 43,672 7.70 93.20 23.2
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. PAYGO n.a. 3.3 LAC lower middle income 4,062 .. .. ..
.. I-C .. .. No reform n.a. none n.a. PAYGO .. 4.3 Africa low income 745 .. .. ..
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. none n.a. PAYGO .. 8.3 Asia lower middle income 1,805
.. I-C .. .. No reform n.a. UI .. mixed .. .. LAC lower middle income 1,758 7.80 .. 67.1
.. I-C fully .. No reform n.a. UI 6 PAYGO .. 2.0 Transition upper middle income 4,524 27.80 .. ..
.. I-C .. .. Introduction of sev p 1992 none n.a. universal .. 4.9 Africa upper middle income 6,063 19.00 .. ..




2001 UI 9 PAYGO .. 4.3 LAC upper middle income 8,121 9.00 20.90 39.8
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. none n.a. mixed .. 3.0 Asia high income ..
.. I-C fully ..
Introduction of sev 
pay 2001
UI 12 mixed 50 4.3 Transition upper middle income 6,423 12.30 .. 36.9
.. I-C .. .. no reform n.a. none .. PAYGO .. 4.3 Africa low income 517 .. .. 38.4
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. PAYGO .. 8.7 Africa low income 160 .. .. ..
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. none .. 7.9 Asia low income 667 .. .. ..





none n.a. PAYGO .. 6.5 Africa lower middle income 1,136 7.50 .. ..
Yes I-C .. .. No reform n.a. UI 52 mixed 45 7.0 OECD high income 39,599 6.90 31.40 16.4
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. PAYGO .. 6.4 Africa lower middle income 3,064 .. .. ..
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. PAYGO .. 4.3 Africa low income 454 .. .. ..
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. PAYGO .. 7.2 Africa low income 610 .. .. ..
















































































Country Background Variables Other Income support Funding  & Taxation Reforms
Yes E-A, E-F .. yes
Increased access 
to Solidarity Fund 
for end-of-service 
benefits for fixed 
term contracts, 
Increased benefits 
level and quality 2009
UI 21 mixed 44 4.3 OECD upper middle income 9,645 7.40 11.50 19.8
.. I-C partially .. Introduction of statu 2008 UI 20 mixed 68 4.3 Transition lower middle income 3,744 .. .. 13.1
No E-A partially yes
Intoduction of fully 
funded severance 
pay savings 
1990 UI .. mixed 50 0.0 LAC upper middle income 5,125 13.00 28.70 39.1
I-C .. .. none n.a. none 13.0 Africa low income 833
I-C .. .. none n.a. PAYGO 10.3 Africa low income 160
I-C .. .. none n.a. PAYGO 4.3 Africa lower middle income 2,601
.. I-C .. .. No reform n.a. UI .. mixed 89 4.3 LAC upper middle income 6,385 5.90 .. ..
.. I-C .. ..
Introduction of sev 
pay 
1996 none n.a. PAYGO .. 5.8 Africa lower middle income 1,105 .. .. ..
.. I-C fully .. No reform n.a. dual 11 mixed 38 7.9 Transition high income 14,222 13.00 .. 33.4
n.a. n.a. n.a. yes .. .. UI .. PAYGO .. 5.7 OECD high income 31,410 ? .. ..
Yes I-C fully .. No reform n.a. UI 33 PAYGO 50 8.7 OECD high income 18,139 7.22 20.80 19.1
Yes I-C .. ..




1996 UI 68 mixed 80 0.0 OECD high income 55,992 4.63 99.20 18.2
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. .. .. none n.a. PAYGO .. 4.3 Africa lower middle income 1,213 .. .. ..
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. PAYGO .. 5.8 LAC upper middle income 5,132 .. .. ..
.. I-C .. .. No reform n.a. none n.a. mixed 53 4.0 LAC upper middle income 4,637 16.00 .. 32.1
.. I-C .. ..
Increase in 
severance 
1991 UI .. mixed .. 4.3 LAC lower middle income 4,202 8.70 .. 34.4
.. I-C untaxed ..
Unfinshed years to 
be considered as 
full years when 
calculating tenure
2003 UI 7 PAYGO .. 10.1 MENA lower middle income 2,270 9.90 26.10 35.1
.. I-C .. .. .. .. UI n.a. PAYGO .. 0.0 LAC lower middle income 3,424 .. .. ..
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. none n.a. 4.3 Africa high income 15,397 .. .. ..
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. none n.a. 3.1 Africa low income 369 .. .. ..
.. I-C fully yes n.a. n.a. dual .. mixed 52 8.6 OECD high income 14,238 8.90 7.60 ..
.. I-C .. ..
Introduction of 
severance pay
2003 none .. PAYGO .. 10.1 Africa low income 344 5.00 12.90 ..
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a.
Provident 
fund
.. 4.3 Asia upper middle income 3,326 .. .. ..
Yes I-C .. yes No reform n.a. dual 60 PAYGO 56 10.1 OECD high income 44,581 8.30 68.00 18.3
Yes I-C .. ..
Statutory min 
payment and extra 
benefit for 
employees with 
more than10 years 
tenure
2008 dual 67 PAYGO 53 7.2 OECD high income 41,051 8.30 7.90 15.3
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. PAYGO .. 10.4 Africa upper middle income 7,502 .. .. ..





















































































Country Background Variables Other Income support Funding  & Taxation Reforms
.. I-C fully .. .. .. UI 6 PAYGO .. 0.0 Transition lower middle income 2,449 12.80 40.70 67.3
Yes I-C fully no No reform n.a. dual 64 PAYGO 43 10.0 OECD high income 40,670 9.20 19.90 16.3
.. I-C .. .. No reform n.a. none n.a. mixed .. 3.6 Africa low income 1,098 .. 70.00 38.4
Yes I-C partially ..
Increase in 
severance pay for 
blue color workers
2007 UI 33 PAYGO 96 0.0 OECD high income 29,240 9.50 30.60 28.6
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. PAYGO .. 7.2 LAC upper middle income 6,029 .. .. ..
.. I-C .. .. No reform n.a. UI .. PAYGO .. 0.0 LAC lower middle income 2,661 2.40 12.90 ..
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. PAYGO .. 2.1 Africa low income 497 .. .. ..
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. none .. 0.0 Africa low income 519 .. .. ..
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. PAYGO .. 4.3 LAC lower middle income 1,518 .. .. ..
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. none n.a. none n.a. 10.1 LAC low income 646 .. .. ..
.. I-C .. .. No reform n.a. UI .. PAYGO .. 7.2 LAC lower middle income 1,918 4.10 ..
.. I-C .. .. No reform n.a. UA 32 mixed 38 4.3 Asia high income 30,863 5.60 21.50 16.6




1994 UI 48 mixed 77 6.2 OECD high income 12,868 6.60 19.90 25.1
.. n.a. .. .. .. .. UI 57 mixed .. 10.1 OECD high income 38,029 .. .. ..
No I-C partially .. No reform n.a. UI .. mixed 40 4.3 Asia lower middle income 1,134 4.30 .. 23.1




none n.a. mixed 15 0.0 Asia lower middle income 2,349 9.10 .. 19.4
.. I-C .. .. No reform n.a. UI 47 PAYGO .. 0.0 Asia upper middle income 4,540 10.90 .. ..
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. .. .. none n.a. PAYGO .. 0.0 MENA lower middle income 2,090 .. .. ..
Yes I-C partially .. No reform n.a. dual 50 mixed 34 4.0 OECD high income 51,049 4.50 31.50 15.8




E-A, E-F partially yes
Option to switch to 
funded occup. 
pension plan
2007 UI 37 PAYGO 68 8.7 OECD high income 35,084 8.10 97.10 27
.. I-C .. .. No reform n.a. none n.a. PAYGO .. 4.0 LAC upper middle income 4,471 11.90 .. 36.4
Yes I-B .. .. No reform n.a. UI 45 PAYGO 34 4.3 OECD high income 39,738 4.60 18.00 11.3
.. I-C .. ..
Change in service 
period for 
calculation of sev 
pay benefits
2010 none n.a. PAYGO 68 4.3 MENA lower middle income 4,216 .. .. 19.4
.. I-C fully .. No reform n.a. UI .. mixed .. 4.3 Transition upper middle income 7,257 8.30 .. 43.2
.. I-C .. .. No reform n.a. none n.a.
Provident 
fund
.. 4.3 Africa low income 738 .. 35.50 34.3
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. none n.a.
Provident 
fund
n.a. 4.3 Asia lower middle income 1,306 .. .. ..
No I-B, E-A partially yes
Option to switch to 
funded occup. 
pension plan
2005 UI 31 PAYGO 42 4.3 OECD high income 17,078 3.60 10.00 27.5
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. funded .. 13.0 Transition lower middle income 2,985 .. .. ..
No I-C untaxed no none n.a. PAYGO .. 13.0 MENA high income 54,260 .. 0.00 ..




2004 UI 6 PAYGO .. 4.3 Transition low income 860 8.80 .. 39.8



















































































Country Background Variables Other Income support Funding  & Taxation Reforms
.. I-C fully .. No reform n.a. UI 12 mixed 58 1.0 Transition high income 11,616 9.90 13.00 39.9
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. No reform n.a. none n.a. none n.a. 8.7 MENA upper middle income 8,175 8.50 .. 34.1
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. PAYGO .. 4.3 Africa lower middle income 764 .. .. ..
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. none n.a. 4.3 Africa low income 222 .. .. ..
.. I-C fully .. No reform n.a. UI 6 mixed 53 8.7 Transition upper middle income 11,141 10.60 10.00 30.3
.. I-C .. .. No reform n.a. UI 87 PAYGO 88 17.3 OECD high income 105,044 4.60 43.60 ..




2005 UI 13 mixed .. 4.3 Transition upper middle income 4,515 34.80 .. ..
.. I-C .. .. No reform n.a. none n.a. PAYGO .. 3.4 Africa low income 461 5.60 .. 39.6
.. I-C .. ..
Right to severance 
pay not applicable 
in case of fair 
dismissal related to 
employee's 
conduct
2000 none n.a. none n.a. 4.3 Africa low income 326 .. 20.60 40.3
No I-C partially .. No reform n.a. none n.a.
Provident 
fund
32 6.7 Asia upper middle income 7,030 3.40 10.30 31.1
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. none n.a. PAYGO n.a. 5.8 Asia lower middle income 4,760 .. .. ..
.. I-C .. .. No reform n.a. none n.a. PAYGO n.a. 4.3 Africa low income 691 8.80 .. 41
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. none n.a. PAYGO n.a. 0.0 Asia lower middle income 2,504 .. .. ..
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. PAYGO .. 4.3 Africa low income 921 .. .. ..
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. mixed .. 4.3 Africa upper middle income 6,735 .. .. ..
.. I-C partially .. No reform n.a. none n.a. funded 36 0.0 OECD upper middle income 8,144 3.20 17.00 30.1
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. none n.a. PAYGO n.a. 0.0 Asia lower middle income 2,476 .. .. ..
.. I-C fully ..
Sev pay only for 
dismissals based 
on the worker's 




2003 UI 15 PAYGO .. 8.7 Transition lower middle income 1,516 6.90 40.00 ..
.. I-C .. .. No reform n.a. none n.a. PAYGO .. 4.3 Transition lower middle income 1,573 3.50 18.4
.. I-C .. .. .. .. UI .. PAYGO .. 2.1 Transition upper middle income 6,635
No E-F .. ..
Increase in 
generosity
2003 none n.a. PAYGO 70 7.2 MENA lower middle income 2,911 11.10 .. 36.4
.. I-C .. .. No reform n.a. none n.a. PAYGO .. 4.3 Africa low income 428 .. .. 40.3
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. PAYGO 4.3 Africa upper middle income 4,267
.. I-C .. ..
Introduction of 
lump-sum payment 





.. 4.3 Asia low income 427 .. .. ..
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. dual 71 mixed 88 8.7 OECD high income 47,917 3.70 20.50 13
Yes I-C fully .. No reform n.a. UA 38 universal 39 0.0 OECD high income 29,352 4.60 20.80 12.7
.. I-C .. .. No reform n.a. none n.a. PAYGO .. 0.0 LAC lower middle income 1,097 6.00 4.10 ..
.. I-C .. .. No reform n.a. none n.a. PAYGO .. 4.3 Africa low income 352 .. .. ..
.. I-C .. .. No reform n.a. none n.a. funded .. 4.0 Africa lower middle income 1,118 .. .. 57.9
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Country Background Variables Other Income support Funding  & Taxation Reforms
No I-C untaxed no .. .. UI n.a. PAYGO .. 4.3 MENA high income 16,207 .. 0.00 ..
.. I-C .. .. No reform n.a. none n.a. PAYGO .. 4.3 Asia lower middle income 955 7.10 15.70 36.8
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. none n.a. PAYGO n.a. 0.0 Asia upper middle income 8,074 .. .. ..
.. I-C partially .. No reform n.a. UI .. mixed .. 0.0 LAC upper middle income 7,155 11.10 .. 64.1
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. funded n.a. 3.3 Asia lower middle income 1,172 .. .. ..
.. I-C .. .. .. .. UI .. PAYGO .. 7.5 LAC lower middle income 2,242 .. .. ..
.. E-A .. ..
Option to withdraw 
50% of account 
before separation
1991 none .. mixed 39 0.0 LAC upper middle income 4,469 7.20 .. 59.9
No I-C untaxed .. No reform n.a. none n.a. PAYGO 68 4.3 Asia lower middle income 1,752 9.70 3.20 43.4
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. UI 42 mixed 61 10.1 OECD high income 11,273 15.70 .. 27.6
Yes I-C .. .. No reform n.a. dual 79 PAYGO 54 7.9 OECD high income 21,903 6.30 19.50 22.6
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. UI .. PAYGO .. 0.0 LAC high income .. .. .. ..
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. PAYGO .. 7.2 MENA high income 69,754 .. .. ..
.. I-C fully yes
Introduction of 
guarantee fund
2003 UI 16 mixed .. 4.0 Transition upper middle income 7,500 7.00 32.30 34.4
.. I-C fully .. dual 12 mixed .. 8.7 Transition upper middle income 8,676 7.70 .. 46.1
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. PAYGO .. 4.3 Africa low income 506 .. .. ..
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. none n.a. none .. 5.8 Asia lower middle income 2,776 .. .. ..
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. PAYGO .. 4.3 Africa lower middle income 1,184 .. .. ..
.. I-C untaxed no
Introduction of end-
of-service benefit
2005 none n.a. PAYGO .. 4.3 MENA high income 14,540 5.20 0.00 ..
.. I-C .. .. No reform n.a. none n.a. PAYGO .. 3.2 Africa lower middle income 1,023 11.10 .. 43.2
.. I-C .. .. .. .. UI .. PAYGO .. 0.0 Transition upper middle income 5,872 .. .. ..
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. none .. 4.3 Asia upper middle income 8,688 .. .. ..
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. PAYGO n.a. 8.7 Africa low income 341 .. .. ..
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. No reform n.a. none n.a.
Provident 
fund
13 3.0 Asia high income 36,537 4.40 31.70 13.1
.. I-C fully .. No reform n.a. UI 32 mixed 56 11.6 OECD high income 16,176 15.80 12.90 18.9
Yes I-C fully yes
Sev pay for 
economic reasons 
or reasons of 
capacity
2007 UI 27 PAYGO .. 5.7 OECD high income 23,726 5.90 .. 27.1
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a.
Provident 
fund
n.a. 4.3 Asia low income 1,256 .. .. ..
.. I-C .. ..
Statutory sev pay 
only in case of 
redundancy
1997 UI 6 universal .. 4.0 Africa upper middle income 5,786 26.40 39.80 28.4





1995 dual 69 PAYGO 81 2.1 OECD high income 31,774 10.60 14.50 22.6






.. 4.3 Asia lower middle income 2,068 7.40 6.00 44.6
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. none n.a. PAYGO .. 8.7 LAC upper middle income 10,988 .. .. ..
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. PAYGO .. 3.7 LAC upper middle income 5,496 .. .. ..

















































































Country Background Variables Other Income support Funding  & Taxation Reforms
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. PAYGO n.a. 4.3 Africa lower middle income 1,294 .. 0.00 ..
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. none n.a. 0.0 Asia upper middle income 5,888 .. .. ..
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a.
Provident 
fund
n.a. 5.9 Africa lower middle income 2,533 .. .. ..
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. No reform n.a. dual 66 mixed 62 14.4 OECD high income 43,654 5.20 73.60 19.1
Yes I-C .. .. No reform n.a. UI 80 mixed 58 10.1 OECD high income 63,629 3.50 23.70 8.8
.. I-C .. .. No reform n.a. none n.a. PAYGO .. 8.7 MENA lower middle income 2,474 11.40 .. ..
.. I-C partially ..
Introduction of 
benefit formula
2005 UI 8 PAYGO 70 4.3 Asia high income .. 4.20 35.90 19.6
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. PAYGO .. 8.7 Transition low income 716 .. .. ..
.. I-C partially ..
Introduction of sev 
pay 
2004 none n.a. PAYGO .. 4.0 Africa low income 509 5.10 18.70 58.3
No I-C untaxed yes No reform n.a. UI .. PAYGO 50 4.3 Asia lower middle income 3,894 1.60 2.10 52.6
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. none n.a. none n.a. 4.3 Asia lower middle income 492 .. .. ..
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. none n.a. 4.3 Africa low income 431 .. .. ..
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. none n.a. none n.a. 0.0 Asia lower middle income 2,991 .. .. ..
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. PAYGO 6.4 LAC high income 15,841 .. .. ..
.. E-F .. ..
Increase in 
severance pay
2002 UA 2 PAYGO 64 4.3 MENA lower middle income 3,792 14.60 .. 38.4
Yes I-C partially ..
Introduction of sev 
pay 
2003 UI 46 PAYGO 87 6.7 OECD upper middle income 8,215 9.70 25.10 32.1
.. I-C .. ..
Severance pay  
subject to 
negotiation btw the 
employer and the 





.. 8.7 Africa low income 490 3.20 .. 43.1
.. I-C fully .. No reform n.a. UI 15 PAYGO .. 8.7 Transition lower middle income 2,468 8.50 .. 52.2
no I-C untaxed no .. .. none n.a. PAYGO .. 4.3 MENA high income 50,070 0.00 ..
Yes I-C partially ..
Statutory sev pay 
only in case of 
redundancy
1996 dual 28 mixed 31 5.3 OECD high income 35,165 5.10 .. 12.6
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. No reform n.a. UI 28 PAYGO 39 0.0 OECD high income 45,989 5.10 11.40 8.8
.. I-C .. .. No reform n.a. UA 5 mixed 103 0.0 LAC upper middle income 9,420 13.50 19.00 51.1
.. I-C fully .. No reform n.a. UI 6 PAYGO .. 8.7 Transition lower middle income 1,156 .. .. ..
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. PAYGO n.a. 9.3 Asia lower middle income 2,702 .. .. ..




1997 UI 6 PAYGO .. .. LAC upper middle income 11,490 12.00 .. 33.6
.. I-C untaxed ..
Introduction of sev 
pay 
2003 UI .. PAYGO 68 0.0 Transition lower middle income 1,032 2.30 .. 15.6
.. I-C .. .. .. .. none n.a. PAYGO .. 4.3 MENA lower middle income .. .. .. ..
.. I-C .. ..
Introduction of sev 
pay 























































Country Background Variables Other Income support Funding  & Taxation Reforms
.. I-C .. .. No reform n.a. none n.a. PAYGO .. 4.3 Africa low income 985 .. .. 48.9
.. I-C .. .. No reform n.a. none n.a. PAYGO .. 13.0 Africa low income .. .. .. 59.4
14 71Notes and Sources 
 
Legal base 
Statutory = 1 if the country has a legally mandated severance pay system, 0 if not. 
Determined by Collective Agreements = 1 if severance payments are determined through 
collective agreements in a sitnificant manner, 0 if not. 
 
Coverage 
Sectors = p if only private sector is covered by severance pay programs in the country, a if both 
private and public sectors are covered. 




Type of termination payment refers to the reasons for employment termination that make the 
worker eligible to receive severance payment (statutory or otherwise); coded as follows: D = 
Dismissal/Involuntary separation (Valid reasons other than economic as provided by the 
employer) ; R=Redundancy (Economic reasons, Redundancy, Reduction of staff, Retrenchment, 
Reorganization, Restructuring, Structural changes, Technological change); E= End of 
service/Voluntary separation (End of contract term, Quits, Voluntary quits, Resignation due to 
economic condition, Military service, Enters school, Family-related issues); O=Old 
Age/Retirement ; I=Incapacity/Disability (Worker’s incapacity to work due to incompetence or 
health reasons: illness or permanent disability); B=Bankruptcy/Closure of 
Organization/Insolvency (Bankruptcy, Business rationalization, Cessation of business, Closure 
of firm, Organization dissolved/ moved, Liquidation). 
 
Defined Benefits for Redundency 
Minimum months’ employment to qualify refers to the number of months the worker should 
have worked for the current employer to qualify for severance payment. 
9 months refers to severance payment (in weeks of salary) made in case of redundancy dismissal 
of worker with tenure of 9 months. 
1 years refers to severance payment (in weeks of salary) made in case of redundancy dismissal of 
worker with tenure of 1 year. 
5 years refers to severance payment (in weeks of salary) made in case of redundancy dismissal of 
worker with tenure of 5 years. 
10 years refers to severance payment (in weeks of salary) made in case of redundancy dismissal 
of worker with tenure of 10 years. 
20 years refers to severance payment (in weeks of salary) made in case of redundancy dismissal 
of worker with tenure of 20 years. 
Generosity index = average per year of service for employees with 1, 5 and 10 years of service 
(in weeks of salary) 
 
End-of-service pay 
Minimum months’ employment to qualify refers to the number of months the worker should 
have worked for the current employer to qualify for severance payment. 
Generosity index = average per year of service for employees with 20 years of service 
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Defined Contribution 
Minimum months’ employment to qualify refers to the number of months the worker should 
have worked for the current employer to qualify for severance payment. 
Contribution rate refers to the percentage of employee's salaray taken as contribution to the 
severance payment account or fund. 
 
Funding & Taxation 
State contribution indicates whether firms receive any assistance from the State; coded Yes/No 
Funding method indicates how firms finance severance pay; coded as follows: I-C: Internal-Cash 
Flows; I-B: Internal-Book reserves; E-A: External-Individual Accounts; E-F: External- 
Centralized Fund 
Taxation of benefits indicates the extent to which worker benefits are taxed and employer 
expenses deductible; coded as follows: a) Workers fully taxed b) Workers partially taxed c) 
Workers not taxed d) Employer expenses not deductible e) Employer expenses partially 
deductible. 
Guarantee fund: yes, no 
 
Other income support 
Type of unemployment insurance system: UI= Unemployment Insurance; UA=Unemployment 
Benefits 
Unemployment benefits generosity: Gross Replacement Rate for Average Incoem Worker. 
Type of pension system: universal, PAYGO=pay-as-you-go system; funded; mixed=both; 
Provident fund 




Redundancy notice: Average weeks for workers with 1, 5 and 10 years of service (WB, Doing 
business) 
 
Country Background variables 
Income level is according to World Bank classification system 
Unemployment rate is the average unemployment rate in the country over the period 2000-2005, 
except in the following cases: Azerbaijan - rate is for 2003, Ethiopia - rate is for 2005, India - 
rate is 
for 2000, Iran - rate is for 2005, Mali - rate is for 2004, Tanzania - rate is for 2001, Zambia - rate 
is for 2000. 
Trade Union Density refers to the ratio of union members earning wages over total wage and 
salary earners. 
Estimated size of informal economy refers to the size of the informal economy as a percentage of 
GDP (varying time periods). 
Share of informal labor refers to the share of the total labor force employed in the informal 




Severance pay and dismissal process: 
Angel-Urdinola and Kuddo (2010); Holzmann and Pouget (2011); ILO EPLex (2011); ILO-
NATLEX (various years); ILO Termination of Employment Digest (2011); Kuddo (2009); 
Mercer (www.mercer.us); OECD Employment Protection Indicators (2008); OECD Employment 
Outlook (various years); World Bank (2010): Doing Business,Towers Watson Employment 
Terms and Conditions (2010). 
 
Other income support and country background variables: 
Unemployment Insurance: OECD (1999); Social Security Programs throughout the World 
(2008-2010); Pensions: OECD (2010): Pensions at a Glance, OECD (2008): Pensions at a 
Glance - Asia-Pacific; World Bank (2007): Pension Panorama; Region, Income level, GDP per 
capita: World Development Indicators, World Bank (2011); Unemployment rate: LABORSTA, 
ILO (www.laborsta.ilo.org); Trade Union Density: ILO 2008-2009; Estimated size of informal 
economy, Share of Informal Labor: Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer 
(2004). 
74ANNEX 3:  Note on Econometric Estimation 
This Annex provides a brief explanation of the 2 key aspects of the econometric explanation in 
Section 4.2:  The use of robust regression, and a summary of critical factors. 
1. Why robust regression? 
Robust regression methods are less affected by violations of some of the assumptions underlying 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. This means they are less influenced by outliers or other 
influential observations and heteroscedasticity. However, a deviation from independence and/or 
normality of error terms (e.g. due to skewness) should be dealt with differently. 
In this dataset, especially skewness may be an issue, as several income-related variables are 
included (GDP per capita and variants, generosity indices). For GDP per capita we overcome 
skewness by using log(GDP per capita) instead. For generosity indices a logarithmic 
transformation is not possible because of the (large number of) zero generosity values. We 
experimented with square roots of the dependent variable. This only had an effect on the results 
of tests of the normality assumption, but not on the overall results in terms of relevance and 
statistical significance of explanatory variables. 
The function "lmrob" of R (2010) CRAN package "robustbase" (Rousseeuw et al. 2009) is used 
to analyze the data. lmrob computes fast MM-estimators for linear regression based on Yohai 
(1987). It uses an S-estimator (Rousseeuw and Yohai, 1984) for the errors which is also 
computed with a bi-square score function. The S-estimator is computed using the Fast-S 
algorithm of Salibian-Barrera and Yohai (2006). Standard errors are computed using the 
formulas of Croux, Dhaene and Hoorelbeke (2003). 
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2.  Summary of Critical Aspects  
Besides robust regression we rely on OLS estimation. For the latter, the following model 
assumptions were examined. 
Independence of error terms:  This assumption is especially relevant for time series 
(autocorrelation). For cross-section (non-time series) data, it can be checked by means of plotting 
75residuals vs. independent variables. For the data analyzed in this paper, these charts indicate 
independence of error terms. 
Homoscedasticity (variance homogeneity) of error terms:  Charts of (standardized) residuals 
vs. fitted values or the square root of standardized residuals vs. fitted values show high residuals 
for many models, especially for those with only 1 or 2 explanatory variables that include most 
observations. For some models the charts indicate the existence of heteroscedasticity with higher 
variability of residuals for larger fitted values. However, neither the Goldfeld-Quandt test (1965) 
nor the Breusch-Pagan test (1979) show significant deviation from the homogeneous variance 
assumption at the 5% level for any model with Severance Pay Generosity as response variable. 
For the dichotomous response variable, the Goldfeld-Quandt test indicates significant 
heteroscedasticity for three models, but this result is not confirmed by the Breusch-Pagan test. 
Therefore, variance inhomogeneity does not seem to be a problem overall. The Ramsey RESET 
test (1969) test is not significant (α=0.05) for the models analyzed, implying the validity of the 
results of the two tests for homoscedasticity. 
Standard normal distribution of error terms:  For hardly any model the normality distribution 
assumption is satisfied. Most Q-Q plots indicate higher skewness and/or heavier tails. Jarque-
Bera tests (1987) confirm this observation. However, linear regression is fairly robust against 
non-normality in case of reasonable sample sizes based on the central limit theorem. Using log 
(GDP per capita) is a step towards normality of residuals by reducing the skewness of their 
distribution. The logarithm or the square root (to avoid issues with zeros) may also be applied to 
the different generosity index variables used in the model, even to the response variable. 
However, as already stated above, the results of the Jarque-Bera test improve but the relevance 
and significance of explanatory variables hardly change for any model when using the square 
root of Severance Pay Generosity Index. 
Linearity of relation between dependent and independent variables:  Only very few potential 
explanatory variables show (bivariate) correlation with the response variables. The only 
significant (α=0.05) linear correlation coefficients between Severance Pay Generosity Index and 
the explanatory variables are those involving log(GDP per capita) and the indicator variables for 
Income Level = high and low, respectively. Actually, the correlation between the regressors is 
stronger (multi-collinearity) than between most regressors and the response variables. Although 
multivariate correlation may still exist, the explanatory variables with the weakest pairwise 
correlation with the response variables in terms of significance and absolute value turn out to 
rarely have significant coefficients in the regression models either. In addition, scatterplots 
indicate that excluding the observations with unemployment benefit generosity, pension benefit 
generosity, and severance pay generosity equal to 0 might reveal linear relations between the 
variables in the remaining countries. This may help overcome the deviation from the linearity 
assumption. 
Goodness of fit:  Another way of validating the linearity of the relation between response and 
explanatory variables is evaluating the goodness of fit of a linear regression. In addition to 
conventional goodness of fit measures such as (adjusted) R squared and various information 
criteria (e.g. AIC (Akaike, 1974), BIC (Schwarz, 1978), etc.) a simple scatterplot of fitted vs. 
observed values of the dependent variable helps to assess the goodness of fit of a regression 
model. In the basic model set, most models have inacceptable levels of the goodness of fit 
measures which is also visible in the charts. Only models with multiple explanatory variables 
show a reasonable goodness of fit, but have the drawback of a reduced number of observations 
76due to missing values. Some of the larger models even shrink the number of observations to 
approx. 20-25% of the original sample size. These models include merely OECD countries with 
a rather high GDP per capita. A generalization of results, thus, seems not valid, as income (GDP 
per capita) and OECD membership are correlated as well as income and the response variable 
Severance Pay Generosity. Groupwise models based on Income level or Region are an option 
here, although splitting the incomplete dataset further decreases the number of observations 
usable by a model. An analysis by region or income level is favorable. The smaller models can 
be calculated for larger samples but hardly have any explanatory / predictive power and are thus 
not to be used. The variable log(GDP per capita) is one of the few consistently significant 
variables. 
Absence of multi-collinearity of independent variables:  A correlation analysis in combination 
with a scatterplot matrix of the independent variables helps detect pairwise collinearity. Multi-
collinearity can be determined by (generalized) variance inflation factors (VIFs) (Fox and 
Monette, 1992). VIFs measure the effect of multi-collinearity on the variance of the regression 
coefficient of an explanatory variable. 
Correlation analysis as well as VIFs show that multi-collinearity is present in the analyzed 
dataset. Apart from Trade Union Density and Notice Period (weeks) all metric variables are 
pairwise correlated. Including indicator variables of the categorical explanatory variables in the 
correlation analysis shows that these two variables as well as the indicator variables for Type of 
Unemployment Benefit = UA and Region = MENA are not significantly correlated to the other 
explanatory variables. Still, the majority of the correlation coefficient is smaller than 0.4, which 
indicates that pairwise collinearity is not as severe. Generalized variance inflation factors 
indicate that log(GDP per capita), Income level, and Unemployment Benefit Generosity are the 
regressors most heavily affected by multi-collinearity. It is advisable to avoid using them all 
together in one model. Especially models that include Income level and/or Region in addition to 
a GDP per capita variable may be problematic. 
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